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Abstract 
With the goal of driving down drug costs, governments across the globe have instituted various forms of 
pharmaceutical price control policies. Understanding the impacts of such policies is particularly 
important in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where lack of insurance coverage means that 
prices can serve as a barrier to access for patients. This dissertation aims to provide new theoretical and 
empirical evidence on the effects of one implementation of pharmaceutical price controls, in which the 
Indian government placed price ceilings on a set of essential medicines. 
Using a unique data set on pharmaceutical quality in the Indian market, I first provide evidence that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in this setting are not of equal quality. Instead, multinational and large, 
exporting generics firms produce higher-quality medicines than those produced by small, local generics 
manufacturers. I then describe a theoretical model of vertically differentiated firms in oligopolistic 
competition, and show how a price ceiling in this setting, even if only binding on high-priced firms, can 
lead to broadly declining prices and shift firm market share away from low-priced firms. 
Last, using a set of national retail pharmaceutical sales and pricing data from 2010-2015 and panel data 
methods, I test the predictions of the theoretical model empirically, examining impacts of an 
implementation of pharmaceutical price ceilings in the Indian market between 2013 and 2014. I find that 
the legislation resulted in broadly declining prices amongst both directly-impacted products and 
competing products. However, the legislation also led to decreased sales of price-controlled and closely 
related products, preventing trade that would have otherwise occurred. The sales of small, local generics 
manufacturers were most impacted by the legislation, seeing a 14.5\% decrease in market share and a 
5.3\% decrease in sales. These products tend to be inexpensive and important for consumer access, but 
they are also of lower average quality, thus consumer welfare impacts are ambiguous. Last, I provide 
evidence that the legislation impacted consumer types differentially. The benefits of the legislation were 
largest for quality-sensitive consumers, while the downsides largely affected poor and rural consumers, 
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ABSTRACT
IMPACTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS ON PRICING, SALES, AND
MARKET-LEVEL QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA
Emma C. B. Dean
Guy David
With the goal of driving down drug costs, governments across the globe have instituted
various forms of pharmaceutical price control policies. Understanding the impacts of such
policies is particularly important in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where lack
of insurance coverage means that prices can serve as a barrier to access for patients. This
dissertation aims to provide new theoretical and empirical evidence on the effects of one
implementation of pharmaceutical price controls, in which the Indian government placed
price ceilings on a set of essential medicines. Using a unique data set on pharmaceutical
quality in the Indian market, I first provide evidence that pharmaceutical manufacturers in
this setting are not of equal quality. Instead, multinational and large, exporting generics
firms produce higher-quality medicines than those produced by small, local generics manu-
facturers. I then describe a theoretical model of vertically differentiated firms in oligopolistic
competition, and show how a price ceiling in this setting, even if only binding on high-priced
firms, can lead to broadly declining prices and shift firm market share away from low-priced
firms. Last, using a set of national retail pharmaceutical sales and pricing data from 2010-
2015 and panel data methods, I test the predictions of the theoretical model empirically,
examining impacts of an implementation of pharmaceutical price ceilings in the Indian mar-
ket between 2013 and 2014. I find that the legislation resulted in broadly declining prices
amongst both directly-impacted products and competing products. However, the legislation
also led to decreased sales of price-controlled and closely related products, preventing trade
that would have otherwise occurred. The sales of small, local generics manufacturers were
most impacted by the legislation, seeing a 14.5% decrease in market share and a 5.3% de-
vi
crease in sales. These products tend to be inexpensive and important for consumer access,
but they are also of lower average quality, thus consumer welfare impacts are ambiguous.
Last, I provide evidence that the legislation impacted consumer types differentially. The
benefits of the legislation were largest for quality-sensitive consumers, while the downsides
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Globally, both government health departments and patients struggle with high and rising
pharmaceutical prices (Abbott, 2017). In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)1 this
issue is exacerbated by low levels of health insurance coverage, making high drug prices an
important impediment to access (Towse et al., 2012). Low-income households living within
LMICs are particularly affected by drug prices, not only due to low income and savings
levels, but also due to over-reliance on medication for health treatment, which results from a
lack of access to medical facilities or trained medical professionals (Hammond et al., 2007).
While medicines represent about 30% of total public and private health expenditures in
developing countries (World Health Organization, 2011), they comprise between 50-80% of
total health spending amongst low-income households in these countries (Hammond et al.,
2007).
The high prices of originator, on-patent drugs in LMICs has long been a contentious is-
sue, but even when generic drugs are introduced into the market, this has not necessarily
been sufficient to achieve affordable prices (Danzon et al., 2015). Large price dispersion
often remains amongst generic formulations of the same product, even after mature generic
markets develop. This is largely due to what are known as “branded generics” markets, in
which producers of generic drugs are able to compete on brand name as opposed to price.
While generics are considered non-differentiated products in high-income countries, many
LMICs do not require generic manufacturers to conduct bioequivalence trials, which ensure
that generic medicines are absorbed in the body in the same strength and timeline as origi-
nator products. Furthermore, lax government enforcement of manufacturing standards can
lead to inadequate quality-control in the manufacturing process of locally-produced generic
medications. In turn, this leads to substandard and falsified medicines on the market –
a serious issue in LMICs where recent studies estimate that 10-15% of medicines are sub-
standard or pure fakes (Bate et al., 2011, 2015). This lack of regulatory assurance creates
1All abbreviations used in this paper are listed in Appendix Section A.1.
1
quality uncertainty in the market, which generic producers may work to overcome by estab-
lishing a reputation for quality through a brand name. However, this system of brand-name
generics impairs the price competition amongst generic equivalents that otherwise might be
expected.
Given the failure of market forces to decrease drug prices and the impact these prices have
on consumers, governments have increasingly implemented price-control legislation that
covers not only on-patent originator medications, but also generic medications. This disser-
tation will examine the impact of one such implementation of price controls, in which the
Indian government set market-based price ceilings on a subset of pharmaceutical products,
including both on-patent and generic medications. Market-based price controls such as the
ones introduced in India have been praised as having potentially important upsides. Not
only are they reasonably easy to develop and implement, but also by basing price controls
on current market prices they arguably still allow for drug companies to earn a profit, thus
may be sustainable in the long term. However, this type of legislation has been criticized
as having potentially serious downsides as well. Companies could in theory react to this
legislation by discontinuing or lowering production of price-controlled drugs and shifting
this manufacturing capacity to more lucrative medications, leading to lower competition
or regional shortages. Further, while price controls are enacted to lower medical spending,
companies who were ex-ante pricing below the price ceiling are not required to lower their
prices, meaning the most price-sensitive consumers do not necessarily benefit. Assessing the
empirical effects of price controls in the Indian market can provide important information
on the magnitude of both its intended and unintended effects.
In this dissertation, I measure the impact of pharmaceutical price ceilings on access to
medicines in the Indian market. To ensure that my analysis reflects true market character-
istics, I first look for actual differences in manufacturer quality and reputation in the Indian
market. To do so, I make use of a unique dataset that tests drugs in the Indian market
for a wide range of quality characteristics (e.g. correct amount of active pharmaceutical
2
ingredient and disintegration time). I find that about 3-9% of drugs are “substandard” and
fail quality tests, however this failure rate differs by producer type. I show that products
produced by small, local generics manufacturers are more than twice as likely to fail quality
testing as compared to large, exporting generics manufacturers and multinational firms.
Average prices in the market reflect this quality differential, as products manufactured by
small, local generics manufacturers are also less expensive than competing products on
average. Given these empirical differences in quality levels, I build a theoretical model
of a pharmaceutical market with vertically differentiated manufacturers operating in an
oligopolistic market. To ensure this model is relevant in a LMIC setting, I allow for mul-
tiple levels of firm quality or reputation. This model suggests that price ceilings will be
efficient at driving down prices, even for products priced ex-ante below the price ceiling.
However, it will also dampen generic competition, leading to increased market share for
high-priced multinational products. Further, assuming marginal costs are sufficiently simi-
lar across firm types, market exit is most likely to occur amongst low-priced firms, despite
these being the least directly affected by price ceiling legislation. With respect to external
validity, the predictions of this model are general, such that they would be applicable for a
wide range of branded generics markets.
I then combine a novel data set on the Indian retail pharmaceutical market with data on
pharmaceutical manufacturers to test the predictions of my theoretical model. In doing so,
I exploit the fact that the price controls implemented in India were partial in nature by
using a difference-in-differences framework to compare changes in outcomes of interest for
price-controlled drugs to non-controlled drugs. To ensure that my results are not driven by
“spillovers” from medications that received a price ceiling to those that did not, I exclude
non-controlled drugs in therapeutic classes where at least one product received a price
ceiling. I first examine the impact of the legislation on pharmaceutical prices and retailer
mark-up, finding significant decreases in both outcomes post-legislation. I then examine the
impact of price ceilings on market sales and find significant decreases in the sales volume of
price-controlled and related products post-legislation. As these sales decreases are not driven
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by companies ceasing production of price-controlled medications, I identify two potential
causes of this decrease in sales – a decrease in advertising by pharmaceutical firms and
firms exiting sub-markets with high distribution costs, which are generally in rural areas. I
present suggestive findings which indicate that both of these factors may contribute to the
decrease in sales post-legislation.
A primary concern about price controls is that manufacturers may cease production of
price-controlled medications, leading to less competition and potentially shortages. As a
last step in this analysis, I test whether firms were more likely to exit price-controlled
markets. I find that local generics manufacturers were more likely to exit price-controlled
markets after legislation, but multinational firms and exporting generics manufacturers were
not. Local generics manufacturers tend to sell inexpensive products, which are important
for consumer access. However, these manufacturers are of mixed reputation, and, as I
show in this dissertation, produce medications that are on average lower quality than those
produced by competing firms. Thus, the impact on consumer welfare of these firms exiting
price-controlled markets is unclear.
There is a large body of evidence on the impacts of pharmaceutical price controls, though
most empirical and theoretical evidence is in the context of high-income countries, as dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 2.2 This literature includes a theoretical discussion of the
impacts of pharmaceutical price ceilings in which Cabrales (2003) and Brekke et al. (2011)
model oligopolistic competition in a vertically differentiated pharmaceutical industry and
show that lower price ceilings should result in higher market shares for branded medications
with respect to generics. Brekke et al. (2011) also show that even if a price ceiling is only
binding on a branded medication, the generic competitors should still react by decreasing
prices. This dissertation expands on this body of literature by expanding these models to
2Not only are there economically important market differences between high-income countries and LMICs,
but also the price controls tend to take different forms in these markets. Most evidence from high-income
countries concerns reference prices, which determine reimbursement levels as opposed to directly controlled
prices. See for instance, Brekke et al. (2011); Stargardt (2010); Puig-Junoy (2007); Grootendorst and Stewart
(2006); Danzon and Ketcham (2004); Pavcnik (2002) and Danzon and Chao (2000), which all discuss the
impacts of pharmaceutical reference prices in the high-income country context.
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an LMIC setting, accounting for both lack of insurance coverage and allowing for multiple
levels of quality. It shows that predicted results from high-income countries will continue
to hold with a set of assumptions. However, loosening these assumptions to account for
market characteristics more common in LMICs – such as increasing distribution costs with
volume – makes predicted results ambiguous.
Despite the growing body of evidence on the impacts of pharmaceutical price controls in
high-income countries, there is little known about the impacts of such controls in LMICs.
This is an important distinction as the impacts may look very different due to lower levels
of insurance coverage, cost-conscious consumers, and a lack of trust in generic medication
quality. Where studies on the impacts of pharmaceutical pricing policies in LMICs do exist,
the analysis is restricted to a limited geographic area or product space (Bhaskarabhatla
et al., 2017; Mohapatra and Chatterjee, 2017; Yang et al., 2013). This dissertation will
contribute valuable empirical evidence on the short-term impact of pharmaceutical price
controls throughout India, expanding the analysis to a broad range of affected products
to assess whether effects are similar across product types and categories. It will also con-
tribute to the literature on the impacts of government pharmaceutical policy in LMICs
more generally (e.g. Chaudhuri et al. (2006); Goldberg (2010); Duggan et al. (2016)).
When debating how best to improve access to medicines in LMICs, it is essential to consider
behavioral response by producers to legislated price decreases. While the Indian setting is
quite specific, it can more generally provide a setting to study how producers respond to
price controls in branded generics markets. This analysis shows that the consumer welfare
impacts of the legislation are mixed – the legislated price decreases led to pricing spillovers,
causing closely related products to decrease their prices as well. However, it also led to exit
of low-cost producers from the market, and an overall decrease in sales of price-controlled
products, suggesting potential shortages of essential medications. Critically, this analysis
provides evidence that consumers living in rural areas, who already suffer from a lack of
access to medicines, may be most impacted by such shortages.
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This dissertation will continue as follows. Chapter 2 will present a literature review on
the impacts of pharmaceutical price controls, both in high-income countries and in LMICs.
Chapter 3 will discuss the issue of pharmaceutical quality and illegitimate medicines. To do
so, it will first present background on the causes of illegitimate medications, the health and
social impacts of illegitimate medications, and existing empirical evidence on the prevalence
of illegitimate medications in LMICs. It will then add to the existing empirical literature
on illegitimate medications, using a novel dataset from India to help identify both which
firms are producing low-quality medications and where low-quality medications are being
produced. Chapter 4 will present a theoretical analysis of the impacts of pharmaceutical
price controls in a vertically differentiated oligopoly market, beginning with a simple model
of two firm types and then expanding this model to fit within the context of branded gener-
ics, allowing for multiple levels of firm quality. Chapter 5 presents new empirical evidence
on the impacts of pharmaceutical price controls using a database of retail pharmaceutical
sales and prices for the Indian market between 2010 and 2015. Chapter 6 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2 : Literature Review on Pharmaceutical Price Controls and
Reimbursement Regulation
Pharmaceuticals are an important part of any health care system, with the potential to
improve health and even to save lives. Rising costs of both innovative and generic medicines
have caused a number of countries or payers to implement cost-containment mechanisms,
including pricing and purchasing policies. In most high-income countries (HICs), national
or social insurance systems cover pharmaceutical products with varying levels of consumer
cost-sharing. Payers in these contexts aim to make pharmaceuticals available to all patients
at a reasonable cost to the either the government or patient paying insurance premiums. In
these insurance systems, price or reimbursement regulation can help to overcome supplier
moral hazard – an issue which arises because patients are not responsible for the full cost of
medicines and are thus very price inelastic. As a result of this demand inelasticity, producers
of on-patent medications will charge higher prices than they would in a non-insured market,
leading to excessive insurance cost and investment in research and development (R&D) as
compared to a non-insured setting. In these settings, payers can use price or reimbursement
regulation as a mechanism to fight this producer moral hazard.
Pharmaceutical prices are also regulated in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), but
often for different reasons than in high-income countries. While these countries may not
always have social or national insurance policies that lead to supplier moral hazard, drug
prices in LMICs tend to be high relative to per capita income (Danzon et al., 2015). A
number of practical considerations lead to these relatively high prices. Multinational firms
may be concerned that low prices in LMICs would undermine the higher prices charged in
HICs through external reference pricing or parallel trade. Further, the highly skewed in-
come distribution in LMICs may lead to manufacturers charging higher prices to target the
wealthier segment of consumers in these countries (Flynn et al., 2009). Last, lack of regu-
latory enforcement or oversight can lead to quality uncertainty for locally produced generic
medications, contributing to competition on brand name which dampens price competition
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between different producers (Danzon et al., 2015). Price regulation in these markets can
help to overcome the non-competitive pricing that arises due to these market conditions.
Price and reimbursement regulation can serve as a tool to constrain costs in the pharma-
ceutical industry, but this regulation comes with tradeoffs. An optimal policy would lead
to competitive pricing, providing drug access and financial protection for patients, while
also continuing to incentivize innovative R&D. Designing such an optimal policy is not a
straight-forward task. As with all policies, regulation of pharmaceutical prices or retailer
margins can have detrimental effects in addition to potentially positive ones. For exam-
ple, regulation of prices has the potential to undermine price competition – evidence from
the 1990s found significant price competition between generic manufacturers in less regu-
lated markets, but regulation undermining generic competition in strict regulatory systems
(Danzon and Chao, 2000).
A range of policies have been implemented to control pharmaceutical prices, a number
of which will discussed in more detail in this chapter. While most of the literature on
pharmaceutical regulation comes from HICs, where relevant and available, this chapter will
pay particular attention to the limited literature from LMICs as well. This chapter will focus
on the literature on internal and external reference pricing, health technology assessment,
direct price regulation, and briefly discuss other mechanisms used or proposed to lower
pharmaceutical prices in LMICs, such as controls on taxation and regulation of supply
chain mark-ups. Last, this chapter will discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on
the effects of price controls on innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.
2.1. Reference Pricing
Reference pricing is a form of price controls where payers establish benchmark prices, or
reference prices, which serve as the maximum reimbursement level for either a single drug
or a group of drugs. These reference prices can be based on the prices of bioequivalent
medicines, similar medicines, or therapeutically equivalent medicines within a country –
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known as internal reference prices – or by using prices of an identical medicine in one or
several other countries, known as external reference pricing. Both of these types of reference
prices will be discussed below.
2.1.1. Internal Reference Pricing
Internal reference prices are set by creating a benchmark reimbursement price based on
prices of bioequivalent or similar products within a country. Internal reference pricing does
not directly legislate prices, and firms are able to set their own prices. Instead, it limits drug
reimbursement levels, making patients pay the difference in list price and reimbursement
price. In this way, these policies act like “copayment” systems, influencing patients to
choose a less expensive option – in this case, the reference drug(s). Reference pricing is
meant to stimulate price competition between producers by making demand more elastic
above the reimbursement price, with the goal of decreasing medical expenditures. In this
way, it creates incentives for firms to lower their prices close to the reimbursement level to
avoid losing market share.
Internal reference pricing can be applied to different groupings of medications. At one end,
it could include multisource bioequivalent medications – in other words, branded and generic
versions of the same medication. This is a well-established and relatively non-controversial
practice, as it conserves payer money without exposing patients to risk of not being able to
access a medication and has minimal effect on R&D expenses (Danzon and Ketcham, 2004).
For instance, the Medicaid program in the United States has long used maximum allowable
charge programs, essentially internal reference prices with maximum reimbursement set at
the price of a relatively inexpensive generic. However sometimes the reference groupings
are broader, including drugs in the same Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical group (e.g.
all statins), or, at the broadest level, all drugs to treat a disease (e.g. all hypertension
medications). These systems of reference pricing are more controversial because they treat
medications with different active ingredients as equal when determining reference price, not
accounting for differences in patient preferences or differences in side effect profile or efficacy
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for different patient types. Further, as this system often groups on-patent medication with
off-patent medication, it may decrease effective patent life and incentives for R&D (Danzon
and Ketcham, 2004).
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature studying the impacts of internal reference
prices across high-income countries. While reference pricing is meant to stimulate price
competition between producers, Danzon and Ketcham (2004) argue that, while branded
products will respond with a price decrease, generic medications may increase price. This
result is driven by the fact that because demand becomes less elastic below the reference
price, products below the ceiling are not incentivized to compete on price and, in turn, prices
for generics are likely to increase and converge at the reference price. Brekke et al. (2011)
show that, if reference prices are set endogenously, both branded and generic products
should respond by lowering their prices. In other words, if reference prices are set based on
a weighted average of current market prices and are updated over time, generic medicines
are incentivized to decrease prices to lead to a lower reference price and higher patient
co-payment for branded medications.
The empirical literature has shown that internal reference prices generally, but not always,
decrease drug prices. In Sweden, internal reference pricing led to a decrease in price amongst
the originator drug in relation to the generic (Aronsson et al., 2001). Implementation
of internal reference pricing in Germany led to prices falling by approximately 10% for
generics and 26% for branded medications (Pavcnik, 2002). Similarly, in Norway, patient co-
payments fell by 13% for generics and 23% for branded medications after implementation of
internal reference pricing (Brekke et al., 2011). Kaiser et al. (2014) find significant decreases
in list prices, reference prices, and co-payments by approximately 22% – largest for generics
at 36% – in a switch from external to internal reference pricing in Denmark. Studying an
implementation of reference pricing by an alliance of private employers in the United States,
Robinson et al. (2017) found an average price decrease of 13.9% for affected medications.
However, an implementation of internal reference pricing in Michigan’s Medicaid program
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for dual-eligible Medicaid and Medicare patients increased prices on average (Kibicho and
Pinkerton, 2012).
In addition to the evidence on drug pricing, a number of studies show that internal refer-
ence pricing leads to a shift from use of high-priced cost-share medications to low-priced
reference drugs by reducing sales of cost-share medications and increasing sales of reference
drugs (Schneeweiss et al., 2002, 2003; Grootendorst and Stewart, 2006; Stargardt, 2010;
Kaiser et al., 2014; Robinson et al., 2017).1 The opposing forces of increasing reference
drug sales and decreasing cost-share drug sales lead to directionally negative, but non-
significant, effects on total (reference plus cost-share) drug sales (Schneeweiss et al., 2002,
2003; Grootendorst and Stewart, 2006; Stargardt, 2010).
Given the price decreases and substitution towards less expensive drugs, empirical evidence
suggests that internal reference prices often lead to decreases in payer expenditures. Puig-
Junoy (2007) finds that internal reference prices led to significant short-term mean monthly
savings (16.7% of lovastatin sales, 51.8% of simvastatin) in Spain. In British Colombia,
Canada, implementations of internal reference prices led to $6.7 million and $1.6 million
in savings within the first year after implementation of price controls (Schneeweiss et al.,
2002, 2003). Kaiser et al. (2014) likewise find large decreases in health care expenditures,
and corresponding decreases in producer reveue, in Denmark. However, the cost savings
for payers are partially due to increasing cost-sharing among patients. For instance, in
Canada, Grootendorst et al. (2005) found that internal reference pricing led to significant
annual savings of $4 million (CAN) for payers, but about 20% of these savings were due
to increased patient cost-sharing amongst patients electing to take higher-cost medications.
Likewise, while an implementation of internal reference pricing by private payers in the
United States led to a decrease in employer (payer) spending of $1.34 million, patient
copayment rates rose by 5.2%, leading to a $0.12 million increase in patient expenditure
1Three exceptions to these findings exist in the literature. Kibicho and Pinkerton (2012) find that generic
(reference) share decreases after implementation of internal reference pricing. Hazlet and Blough (2002) and
Grootendorst et al. (2005) find null effects on the sales of reference drugs.
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(Robinson et al., 2017). In Norway, however, Brekke et al. (2011) found that both payer
and patient expenses decreased after implementation, despite the increase in patient cost-
sharing responsibility for branded drugs. The authors use weighted average molecule prices
to show an overall cost reduction of almost 30%, caused both by the decreases in prices and
by the shift to generic drugs.
Despite a general decrease in payer expenditure and treatment cost, two studies found that
internal reference pricing led to expenditure increases for payers. In Michigan’s Medicaid
program for dual-eligible Medicaid and Medicare patients, where internal reference pricing
led to an increase in prices, the policy led to a small, but significant, increase in daily cost
of therapy (Kibicho and Pinkerton, 2012). In an interesting case, Taiwan’s National Health
Insurance set internal reference prices for a set of medications used by chronic patients
whose care was managed by hospitals. This led to a decrease in daily expenditure for
medications (by 5.8-14.8%), but it also led to longer prescription lengths. As the second
effect outweighed the first, there ended up being an overall increase in expenditures (Chen
et al., 2008).
Recent theoretical work signals a possible negative impact of internal reference pricing,
which is its potential to reduce generic entry. Brekke et al. (2016) show that, as predicted
elsewhere, reference pricing can encourage price competition. However, in a free entry
equilibrium, reference pricing can limit generic entry, despite the impact of patient cost
sharing for branded medications. This is due to a large price response on the part of the
branded drug to reference pricing, which reduces expected profits for generic producers.
This result makes the net effect of reference prices on overall drug expenditures ambiguous,
as the entry decisions amongst generic producers may offset price savings. However, the
authors note that if reference pricing is combined with price caps, a common regulatory tool
in Europe, that generic entrants may increase if the price cap is binding and sufficiently
strict. This occurs because the price cap regulation can weaken the response of branded
producers to reference pricing, allowing generics to earn higher market share. The authors
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note that despite the potential adverse effects of reference pricing on generic entry, reference
pricing can increase total welfare and consumer welfare. This is driven by correction of
excessive generic entry that would occur under a pure coinsurance model and by improving
sorting amongst brand-biased consumers.
Internal reference pricing can only be used by payers – either government or private – and is
not applicable in markets where patients pay out of pocket, as is common in LMICs. There
are, however, some exceptions. Kyrgyzstan has notably used internal reference pricing on a
set of generic medications as part of their Mandatory Health Insurance Fund, which covers
78% of the country’s population (Ibraimova et al., 2011). In the private sector, Medscheme,
a private health insurer in South Africa, introduced generic reference pricing, where enrollees
were responsible for any price differences. This was reported to lead to half of the affected
medicines either dropping price or not increasing prices within the year of implementation
(Rothberg et al., 2004).
Related to internal reference pricing, but inherently different in a number of ways, are
formularies. Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) in the United States often use tiered
formularies, in which medications are grouped into therapuetic categories. Within these
categories, both manufacturer reimbursement and patient copayments can differ. In this
way, the PBM can steer patients to more cost-effective treatments through differing co-
payments and encourage manufacturers to offer discounts through their ability to steer
patients to certain preferred medications. Generally, tiered formularies will have the low-
est copayments for generics, higher copayments for preferred brands, and the highest level
of copayments for non-preferred brands. This means that different medicines within the
same therapeutic category are often reimbursed at different rates - setting this apart from
reference pricing. Further, when one drug in a therapeutic class loses patent protection,
this does not lead to reimbursement levels for on-patent products falling to generic levels.
On-patent drugs instead will continue to be placed in preferred or non-preferred branded
tiers. Due to the tiered nature of formularies, patient copays are less variable or flexible
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under formularies than reference pricing.
2.1.2. External Reference Pricing
External reference pricing is a strategy where countries use prices of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts in other countries as a reference price or bargaining tool when negotiating with phar-
maceutical companies over prices within their own country. This approach limits a manu-
facturer’s ability to price-discriminate across countries, but does not directly lead to com-
petition between different products. External reference pricing is common in high-income
countries, and is used by many European countries to control prices of on-patent pharma-
ceuticals, with 20 of the 27 European Union countries and 24 of the 34 OECD countries
using external reference pricing in 2013 (World Health Organization, 2013). For LMICs, a
study by the World Health Organization suggested that half of surveyed LMICs used exter-
nal reference pricing as the only or one of several approaches to price setting (World Health
Organization, 2013). Brazil, as an example, references the lowest price from the European
Union to determine its prices in the private sector, but requires a 26% reduction for its
public sector, which generally serves the low-income population. External reference pricing
is relatively easy to implement, meaning it is feasible to implement even in resource-limited
settings. However, the success of external reference pricing depends on choosing correct
reference countries and the ability to obtain actual prices paid versus published prices.
External reference pricing is often used in conjunction with other mechanisms to control
price, making it difficult to determine its impacts (Ruggeri and Nolte, 2013). H̊akonsen
et al. (2009) found that use of external reference pricing led to substantial price reductions
in Norway, however did not provide estimates of these price reductions. Danzon and Epstein
(2011), however, find evidence that external referencing raises launch prices in referenced
countries, though it is unclear how much of this impact can be contributed to parallel
trade considerations. Stargardt and Schreyögg (2006) assessed the impact price changes in
Germany had on prices in other countries that refer to Germany either directly or indirectly
as part of their external reference pricing scheme, finding that a decrease in price by e1.00
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in Germany decreases prices by e0.36 and e0.15 in Italy and Austria, respectively.
In response to external reference pricing, firms may strategically adjust both launch timing
and launch pricing, or even decide not to launch in low-priced countries, to reduce spillovers
into higher-priced markets. Indeed a large literature documents that external reference
pricing contributes to either non-launch of new drugs or delayed launch of drugs, particularly
in lower-priced European Union markets (Danzon et al., 2005; Kyle, 2007; Lanjouw, 2005;
Danzon and Epstein, 2011; Espin et al., 2011). In one example of this literature, Maini and
Pammolli (2017) use European pharmaceutical data from 2002 to 2012 to document long
launch delays for new medications, up to an average of three years in Eastern Europe. Using
a dynamic structural model to account for allow for externalities in price, the authors found
that removing external reference prices would decrease launch delays in Eastern Europe by
up to 14 months. As LMICs are often low-priced markets, external reference pricing could
have important impacts on launch decisions or launch delays in these countries. Though it
is unlikely that a HIC would reference a LMIC in their external price regime, it is certainly
true that LMICs either formally or informally reference each other’s prices. In one extreme
example, Brazil issued a compulsory license for Merck’s AIDS drug efavirenz, citing as one
reason the cheaper price in Thailand, which Merck had agreed to after Thailand had issued
their own compulsory license on efavirenz.
An important consideration to external reference pricing is that it hampers a multinational
firm’s ability to price discriminate across countries.2 While evidence from the European
Union indicates that pharmaceutical prices do differ across countries, external reference
pricing creates a concern that reference pricing will cause a convergence of prices, with
little downward pressure in pricing over time (Danzon and Towse, 2003). The ability of
multinational firms to price discriminate across markets is a particularly important concern
2While not discussed in detail here, parallel trade can also constrain firms’ abilities to price discriminate
across markets, though with the notable difference that firms are able to limit parallel trade through supply
restrictions or dual pricing mechanisms. Thus, even in the European Union, where parallel trade is legal,
parallel imports make only a small percentage of sales even in relatively high-priced countries (Danzon,
2012).
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when considering welfare impacts in LMICs. Differential pricing, based on Ramsey pricing
principles, has been cited as a potential efficient and equitable way to pay the joint global
costs of pharmaceutical R&D (Danzon and Towse, 2003). External reference pricing can
limit firms’ abilities to enact differential pricing, though mechanisms such as confidential
rebates may help overcome this shortfall.
2.2. Health Technology Assessment and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Health technology assessment (HTA) is the systematic evaluation of the impacts, both
benefits and costs, of health care technology. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is generally
applied within health technology assessment. In CEA, payers examine incremental health
benefits and costs relative to existing treatments to set reimbursement prices based on a
set of willingness-to-pay per outcome measures, such as quality-adjusted life years saved.
Countries or payers implementing CEA generally use incremental cost effectiveness ratio
(ICER) thresholds, which serve as a bound on willingness-to-pay for a given level of cost-
effectiveness. These ICER thresholds serve as an indirect price constraint for manufacturers
– given a drug’s health benefits, it may not charge a price that exceeds a given country’s
ICER threshold. Prime examples of implementations of this cost-setting mechanism in
HICs are the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)
and Germany’s The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Healthcare (known as IQWiG).
A number of other HICs including Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and several Canadian
provinces have also used CEA. Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, and
Portugal have also requested economic submissions for either some or all new medicines
(Towse et al., 2012).
CEA has the advantage of allowing for consistent standards across different medication
classes, helping with efficient budget allocations. Further, by incentivizing medication ef-
fectiveness and novelty, this approach sets appropriate incentives for R&D, as firms with
more effective medications can charge more than less effective medications. Concerns to this
approach include launch delays, lack of data availability – as often the only available efficacy
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data at launch is from controlled clinical trials – and the cost associated with gathering and
analyzing such data. Updating CEA over time as new data becomes available is one strat-
egy to overcome the lack of data at launch, but this comes with its own set of problems,
such as nonrandom treatment assignment. As the ICER threshold is generally known to
manufacturers, there is also a concern that producers, knowing their level of efficacy, will
price to the ICER threshold, potentially raising prices.
Given that HTA is often used jointly with other mechanisms, such as internal reference
pricing, it is difficult to study its impacts. In one study, Drummond et al. (2011) compared
health technology assessment with internal reference pricing in regards to initial price and
reimbursement status for innovative drugs in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the
UK. They find no clear impact of health technology assessment on prices, with the impact
of reference pricing substantial only when there are large differences in the prices of drugs
in a given class or when one drug in a group becomes generic. However, the authors
suggest that reference pricing alone is not a good approach to maximize value for money
from pharmaceuticals, and that health technology assessment is a better policy in that it
rewards innovation and value for money.
A number of middle-income countries, including Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Mex-
ico, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey have all implemented health technology assessments
(Oortwijn et al., 2010), as have Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Bul-
garia (Gulácsi et al., 2014). In Latin America, 13 countries are now collaborating on health
technology assessment as part of a regional network (World Health Organization, 2013).
There is currently no study assessing the efficacy of health technology assessments on pric-
ing and availability in LMICs.
2.3. Direct Price Regulation
In direct price regulation, a government directly restricts the prices a manufacturer can
charge. This regulated price can be determined in a number of ways - by measuring costs
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and limiting producer margins, by external referencing to foreign prices for the same med-
ication, or by internally referencing to other products on the market. Both high-income
countries, including Italy and France, and LMICs have implemented direct price controls
on pharmaceuticals. However, direct price regulation is a particularly important tool in
LMICs due to a lack of insurance coverage. When there is no payer with significant market
power, reference pricing is not a possibility, but direct price controls are a mechanism the
government can use to lower prices for constituents. This section will provide more details
about two types of direct price regulation - cost-plus pricing and market-based price controls
- which have both been used in LMICs.
2.3.1. Cost-Plus Pricing
Cost-plus pricing is a price-control mechanism where retail prices for medicines are set as
a function of the cost of production for the product, allowing for margins for promotional
expenses and profit margins for manufacturers, wholesalers, and distributers. Setting prices
based on production costs, when relevant adding a transfer cost to incorporate R&D, has
been used both in HICs, including Italy, and in a number of LMICs. While such regulation
is easily justifiable, it undermines incentives for efficient production, as firms can not keep
any surplus gained. Moreover, it is difficult to correctly measure pharmaceutical costs,
particularly when incorporating R&D considerations, which may lead to cost “padding” by
producers.
India provides a valuable case study of an implementation of cost-plus price controls. Im-
portantly, these controls were normative, and did not allow for producer-level differences.
Between 1995 and 2013, India used cost-plus pricing to set prices for a set of essential bulk
medicines, with retail prices set as follows (Watal, 2002):
Retail Price = (MC + CC + PM + PC) ∗ (1 + MAPE100 ) + ED
Where MC is material cost including wastage allowance, CC is conversion costs (labor,
energy, R&D, etc.), PM is packing materials, PC is packing costs, MAPE is maximum
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allowable post-manufacturing expenses (distribution and supply chain markups) and ED is
excise duty. A policy review indicated that between 1996 and 2006, prices of all medicines
in India rose by an average of nearly 40%, while price-controlled medicines only rose in price
by 0.02% (World Health Organization, 2013). However, this policy was widely opposed by
the pharmaceutical industry, and the Indian government had difficulty ascertaining costs
and enforcing prices (Lanjouw, 1998; David, 1998). There was also industry concern these
measures unfairly penalized high-quality and exporting firms. D.G. Shah, Secretary General
of the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance, sums up the perceived failure of cost-plus pricing in
India, saying:
“Now, we have a few state-of-the-art world class plants and processes. But
there are also hundreds of plants with primitive facilities struggling to comply
with minimum good manufacturing practices and quality standards . . . and
zero spending on R&D. Normative costing cannot provide a level playing field
to all. Either it is unfair or too liberal. Wherever it is unfair, the companies
find it difficult to sustain production. This leads to undesirable aberrations,
including tweaking of compositions to escape price control, curtailing supply, or
suspending production. Wherever it is liberal, it has led to distortions in trade
margins. The ‘normative’ costing system lacks transparency. Its discretionary
powers are prone to manipulation. It discourages innovation and efficiency as the
benefits cannot be retained by the manufacturer. Normative costing does not
recogni[z]e costs incurred for R&D and export market development. The uniform
Maximum Allowable Post-manufacturing Expenses discriminates against those
engaged in these activities.” (Shah, 2012).
Other LMICs have used cost-plus price-setting for pharmaceuticals, including Bangladesh,
China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Pakistan. There is limited evidence on the effects
of these policies. Bangladesh uses cost-plus pricing for a list of essential medicines, including
a fixed-percentage markup over costs. A report using 2002 data indicated that since the
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adoption of cost-plus pricing, essential medicine use increased relative to other medication,
however, as in India, the government struggled to implement the policy, dampening its effect
(World Health Organization, 2013). China is an interesting case study as its government
initially implemented market-based pricing but due to the problems associated with it, such
as price increases, poor quality control, corruption, and kickbacks, the country switched to a
cost-plus system for essential medicines. Even after the switch to cost-plus pricing, findings
on China’s drug prices in comparison to other comparator countries have been mixed (Sun
et al., 2008).
2.3.2. Market-Based Price Controls
Market-based price controls generally set a maximum allowable price for medicines, with
the maximum price based on current market prices for a given medication or group of
medications. In this way, these type of controls are similar to internal reference prices,
except that they restrict actual retail prices versus setting a maximum reimbursement price.
Market-based price controls have many of the same issues as internal reference prices. By
restricting prices, they may discourage entry of less-expensive generics, as these will not be
able to gain enough market share (similar to the concept addressed in Brekke et al. (2016)).
If the price control is in the form of a ceiling price, products priced below the price ceiling
are not required to reduce prices. In insured areas, this could potentially lead to a conver-
gence in price as low-priced products may increase their price to the ceiling. In non-insured
areas, this means that the most cost-conscious consumers do not necessarily benefit. Medi-
cation quality may also have important tie-ins to market-based price controls, particularly
in an LMIC setting. If producing high-quality medicines comes with the increasing cost of
ensuring quality, then high-quality firms may be disproportionately disadvantaged by such
price controls unless price setting takes this into effect.
This dissertation will examine in detail one implementation of market-based price controls
implemented in India between 2013 and 2014. Two other papers have examined the impacts
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of this legislation, focusing on different product markets. Bhaskarabhatla et al. (2017)
study the impacts of the legislation on metformin sales in the Indian market, finding that
the price controls had only minor benefits to consumers in this market. Mohapatra and
Chatterjee (2017) study the antimalarial market in India and find that under price controls
firms are likely to withdraw products, particularly from poor areas of the country. Further,
the authors note that, depending on the level price controls are set, that the decrease in
consumer welfare in poor areas might exceed the consumer welfare increase from lower
prices, leading to a net decrease in consumer welfare.
2.4. Other Price Control Methods
In addition to the methodologies listed above, a number of other strategies have been used
or proposed to control pharmaceutical prices in LMICs. Two of these will be discussed
below: taxation of medications and regulation of supply chain mark-ups.
2.4.1. Taxation
Most countries tax pharmaceutical products, either directly or indirectly. Policies to reduce
the cost of pharmaceuticals might involve lowering or decreasing taxes to consumers, which
can be particularly high in LMICs. A 2003 study of duties and taxes applied to pharma-
ceutical prices for communicable diseases by the European Commission found that value
added taxes were generally higher in LMICs, where average pharmaceutical taxation rate
was 11-12%, than in the European Union, where the average pharmaceutical taxation rate
was 7% (Levinson and Laing, 2003). Of the 57 countries studied, total duties and taxes
(customs duty + value added tax + other duties) were highest in India, at a staggering
60%. On the other extreme, Malaysia does not tax pharmaceutical products and had only
0.01% total duties for pharmaceuticals.
Tax exemptions are most likely to improve equity by increasing accessibility for the poor,
however they also result in a loss of revenue for the government. If the taxes from pharma-
ceutical products are invested back into the local health care system, they have the potential
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to positively affect overall health access. However, the impacts of pharmaceutical taxation
might be minor compared to overall taxation rates. Olcay and Laing (2005) studied phar-
maceutical tariffs in 150 countries, and found that these tariffs generate less than 0.1% of
GDP in 92% of countries.
2.4.2. Regulation of Supply Chain Mark-Ups
Supply chain mark-ups are applied to products to account for overhead costs, distribution
costs, and profits for intermediaries. Different forms of mark-up regulation for pharmaceuti-
cals might include the regulation of wholesale or retail mark-ups or pharmaceutical profits.
This is a particularly relevant concern in LMICs as supply chain mark-ups in LMICs tend to
be much higher than in HICs, particularly for generics (World Health Organization, 2013).
A number of LMICs have regulated supply chain mark-ups. Mexico negotiates wholesaler
and retail margins with individual manufacturers (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004).
Albania sets mark-ups for wholesalers and retailers at 12% and 29%, respectively, for re-
imbursed medicines, and 18% and 33% for non-reimbursed medicines (Ball, 2011). South
Africa takes a different strategy, setting a maximum exit price and letting importers, manu-
facturers, wholesalers, and retailers determine how that price is split (Ball, 2011). Regressive
mark-ups are used in the private market in Kenya, with most drugs receiving mark-ups of
10-20%, but antiretrovirals only receiving 2% mark-ups (Ball, 2011). Lebanon, Lithuania
and Tunisia have also adopted regulated regressive mark-ups for wholesalers or retailers, as
have many high-income countries, including Australia, France, Germany, and Switzerland
(Ball, 2011).
2.5. The Effect of Price Controls on Innovation
Drug development is extremely expensive – recent estimates suggest that the private costs
of bringing a new pharmaceutical product to market are close to $2.6 billion when including
cost of capital (DiMasi et al., 2016). A commonly voiced concern in the debate over phar-
maceutical price controls is that pharmaceutical companies need to charge high prices to
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recoup the costs of research and development (R&D) and price controls will stifle incentives
for pharmaceutical companies to innovate.
Standard economic theory predicts that firms will continue to invest in an input until the
expected marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) is equal to the marginal cost of capital
(MCC). Firms will invest in the highest MEI investments first, and continue to invest in
potential projects according to rank of MEI until MEI is less than MCC. While neoclassical
economics would assume MCC is constant and equal to the real market interest rate, this
would require assumptions that are not realistic, such as perfect information between bor-
rowers and lenders. In reality, cash flows have a lower MCC than debt or equity, and thus
are particularly important in determining firm investment in R&D (Vernon, 2002–2003).
Price controls particularly impact cash flows to pharmaceutical firms, and therefore may
have a large impact on incentives for investment in R&D.
There is little evidence on the direct effects of price controls on pharmaceutical investment in
R&D or innovative output. Bardey et al. (2010) create a model of reference price regulation
and long-run innovation, calibrated with data on the statin market from France. The
authors find that reference price legislation decreases the intensity of research, generally
delays innovation, and shifts the types of innovations brought to market away from small
innovations. Empirical evidence on the impact of price controls on investment is limited to
simulations or evidence on the impacts of increased demand for medicines. With respect
to the former, simulations suggest that an increase in the real price of pharmaceutical
products of 10% would lead to a 6% increase in R&D expenditures (Giaccotto et al., 2005).
An alternative study predicted that cost-plus price controls (price controls that incorporate
the cost of a medication plus a producer mark-up) would lead to a reduction in 50-year
innovative output of between 30-37%, whereas less extreme forms of price controls would
lead to a 6-24% decrease in innovative output (Vernon, 2003). An alternative way to
examine the problem is to look at cases where a natural experiment changes the expected
profitability for medicines by impacting demand or ability to pay. If investment in innovation
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or innovative output change with these increases in demand, then, at least theoretically, an
increase in price might have a directionally similar impact on pharmaceutical innovation. A
number of studies find a causal link between profitability and innovation effort, as measured
by early stage increases in innovative activity such as clinical trials (Finkelstein, 2004;
Blume-Kohout and Sood, 2013), and even in innovative output as measured by number of
new products launched (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Dubois et al., 2015). A caveat to all
these studies is that not all innovation is created equal – “me-too” products or products for
which there already exists a close substitute are not as valuable to society as medications for
diseases without effective treatments. Dranove et al. (2014) show that the rise in innovation
in diseases primarily affecting the elderly following the launch of Medicare Part D largely
consisted of products for which similar treatments were already available. They find no
increase in innovation for breakthrough medications, which would have the greatest welfare
benefits for consumers. Similarly, Finkelstein (2004) shows that the increase in clinical
trials for vaccines following policies to increase usage of existing vaccines was largely socially
wasteful, with one exception.
While price controls in high-income countries may have an impact on pharmaceutical in-
novation, these are high-profit regions for pharmaceutical companies. Pricing policies in
LMICs may not have a large impact on innovation as they are unlikely to vastly shift phar-
maceutical profitability. One hypothesized exception to this might lie in what are known as
“neglected” diseases, or diseases which are mostly prevalent in LMICs (e.g. dengue fever)
for which no treatments exist and for which there is little economic incentive to invest in
innovation. However, (Kyle and McGahan, 2012) find that increased patent protection, one
mechanism to increase pharmaceutical profitability, is associated with R&D increases in
high-income countries, but not in LMICs, even for neglected diseases. Duggan et al. (2016)
find that patent protection only led to modest price increases after adoption in India, which
might partially explain this finding. Alternatively, even additional profitability might not




The bulk of evidence on the impacts of pharmaceutical price or reimbursement regulation
comes from high-income countries, where payers use market power to combat producer
moral hazard caused by consumer insurance coverage. Evidence from the literature in HICs
suggests that the design of legislation is critical. For example, exogenous internal reference
pricing can lead to a lack of competition amongst generics, even increasing generic prices.
However endogenous internal reference pricing, with regular reference price updates, can
lead to generic medicines lowering prices and significant cost savings to payers and patients.
Further, even methods such as CEA, which comes with efficient incentives for R&D and
can allow for equitable budget allocation between different diseases, may have important
downsides.
While most attention on pharmaceutical pricing – both in HICs and LICs – has focused on
reducing the prices of on-patent medications, off-patent markets with generic competitors
have also been an important market for regulation. Payers depend on competition between
generic producers to drive down costs of off-patent medication, however a number of mech-
anisms can cause non-competitive pricing in generics markets. In HICs, when incentives to
patients or intermediaries are not appropriate, generics may not be encouraged to compete
in price. As an example, if pharmacists are paid a flat fee plus cost of purchase for dispens-
ing a medication, they are not incentivized to shop for the cheapest generic available. In
LMICs, non-competitive pricing in generics industry is often driven by “branded generics”
markets, which result from uncertain quality of locally-produced generics. Though often
ignored, this non-competitive pricing can have large implications on consumers ability to
afford medication in the long-term.
While LMICs often use the same price control mechanisms as HICs, the impacts of such
policies can be vastly different across these countries. For instance, external reference pricing
can negatively impact LMICs by leading to significant launch delays, or even decisions not
to launch. Importantly, external reference pricing also hampers multinationals ability to
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price discriminate and launch at lower prices in LMICs. There is lack of empirical knowledge
on the differing impacts of policies across LMICs and HICs, and this is an important area
of future research.
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CHAPTER 3 : Evidence on Pharmaceutical Quality from India
Substandard and falsified medications pose a serious global public health hazard. In 2011,
at least 124 countries reported cases of either falsified or substandard medications, with
low- and middle-income countries (“LMICs”) particularly affected (Buckley and Gostin,
2013). Low-quality and fake medications have serious public health and social impacts, but
despite these significant negative impacts, there is limited research on which producers are
manufacturing these types of medicines and where they are being produced. This chapter
will take the first step in this process by using novel empirical data from the Indian market
to examine which producers are most likely to produce low-quality medicines, as well as
examine where these medications are typically produced.
The term “illegitimate drugs” has been used to describe both substandard and falsified
medications. While both types of medications are harmful for consumers, in many ways
their causes are economically different and thus governments need different tools to tackle
each of these types of illegitimate medications. Substandard medications do not meet listed
pharmacopoeia requirements – among many other potential issues, this could take the form
of not having the correct amounts of listed active ingredients, including unlisted ingredients,
or dissolving too quickly or too slowly. They are generally produced by legitimate drug
producers, but do not meet local pharmacopoeia standards1 due to lack of quality control
or failure to adhere to good manufacturing practices. The term “falsified medications”
is sometimes interchanged with “counterfeit medications” and is not uniformly defined.
The majority of falsified medications are pure fakes (e.g. sugar pills), however counterfeit
medications that meet quality standards do exist. These medications certainly violate
intellectual property laws, but are not necessarily harmful for consumers. For the purpose of
this chapter, the term falsified medications will refer to pure fakes, or counterfeit medications
1Different countries use different pharmacopoeia standards, for instance by allowing different ranges of
acceptable drug concentration, making it particularly difficult to define when a drug should be classified as
substandard. Indian Pharmacopoeia standards are used to judge substandard medications for the empirical
analysis in this chapter.
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that have no active ingredient.
This chapter will begin with background on illegitimate drugs, including the root causes
of these medications, their impacts, and existing empirical evidence on their prevalence.
Next, it will present new empirical evidence on drug quality in India, making use of a
unique dataset from the Indian Food and Drugs Control Administration.
3.1. Background on Drug Quality and Illegitimate Drugs
This section will discuss the causes of both substandard and falsified medication, the nega-
tive public health, economic, and social impacts of illegitimate drugs, and existing evidence
on the prevalence of illegitimate medication in LMICs.
3.1.1. Causes of Illegitimate Drugs
The root causes of substandard and falsified medications differ, however lack of regulatory
requirements, oversight, and penalization contribute to both, as do uneven awareness of
medical quality and erratic supply of medications.
Substandard medicines are generally produced by legitimate manufacturers and occur when
firms fail to adhere to good manufacturing practices. This could include, amongst other
causes, lack of quality-control and verification processes or failure to ensure sterile condi-
tions such as water filtration systems. Ensuring proper quality control includes not only
manufacturing concerns such as regular batch testing and maintaining sterile facilities, but
also contracting with quality-assured suppliers. Manufacturers face the same asymmetric
information issues as consumers and may find it difficult to determine which suppliers of
active pharmaceutical ingredients are of high quality. Multinational firms – both originator
and generic – generally operate on a large scale, allowing them to recoup the costs associ-
ated with high-quality manufacturing plants and ensuring high-quality suppliers. Smaller,
local manufacturers may neglect these components due to logistical or cost constraints. All
firms face high initial capital investments to ensure high-quality plants. When it is difficult
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to obtain business improvement loans – as is often the case in LMICs – manufacturers only
have their profits to rely on for capital (Buckley and Gostin, 2013), incentivizing companies
to maximize profits by cutting costs, potentially by reducing quality-control measures.
Falsified medicines are often produced by opportunistic criminal organizations, exploiting
weak regulatory systems and insufficient medical supply (Buckley and Gostin, 2013). Pro-
duction costs for falsified medications are low, and chances of not getting caught are high
– most police action is limited to brief raids – making the production of falsified medicines
attractive to criminals (Buckley and Gostin, 2013). In this way, both a lack of police en-
forcement and corruption within government organizations can contribute to the existence
of falsified medicines.
Lack of prompt, enforced recall systems contribute to the proliferation of illegitimate med-
ications in LMICs. While countries with strong regulatory systems are not immune to
illegitimate medicines, they have systems in place for quick recalls, limiting the damage
these medicines can cause. For example, in 2006 the United States Food and Drug Admin-
istration (“FDA”) withdrew two batches of counterfeit glucose test strips used in Johnson
& Johnson’s LifeScan division’s OneTouch Ultra blood glucose monitors, which produced
inaccurate blood glucose level readings – an issue which could lead to potentially fatal errors
in insulin dosing (U.S. Food & Drugs Administration, 2006). The issue was traced back
to approximately one million falsified test strips that were produced by Halson Pharma-
ceuticals in Shanghai, China, and repackaged in counterfeit wrapping in India before being
distributed to eight countries and thirty-five U.S. states (Bloomberg News, 2007; Loftus,
2011). The FDA identified which strips had issues, and notified consumers to inspect the
serial numbers on their boxes and replace substandard batches (U.S. Food & Drugs Ad-
ministration, 2006). Within two years, all of the substandard test strips had been recalled
in the U.S., but customers and investigators continued to find these faulty test strips in
Egypt, India, and Pakistan between 2009 and 2011, suggesting that recall efforts were not
as successful in these countries (Loftus, 2011).
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3.1.2. The Effects of Illegitimate Drugs
Illegitimate drugs have serious impacts for patients, with wide-ranging public health conse-
quences. On the extreme end are rare cases of poisoning from high doses of toxic ingredients
included in medications – of which there have been numerous documented cases (Buckley
and Gostin, 2013).2 A more common issue is treatment failure or disease progression due
to ineffective medicines. As there are generally other potential causes of treatment fail-
ure inherent to the disease and medication used, physicians and patients generally do not
suspect low-quality medicines as the root cause of disease progression. Thus, illegitimate
medicines may be one largely unmeasured cause of high mortality and morbidity rates in
LMICs (Buckley and Gostin, 2013). As illegitimate antimicrobials often contain low or
inconsistent dosages, they can lead to antimicrobial resistance and drug-resistant disease
strains (Kelesidis and Falagas, 2015). Dr. Lucica Ditiu of the World Health Organization’s
(WHO’s) Stop TB program cites low-quality medicines as one cause, in addition to poor
medical practices, for the rise of multi-drug resistant, extensively drug-resistant, and totally
drug-resistant tuberculosis (Kelland, 2012).
In addition to their health impacts, illegitimate drugs have both economic and social con-
sequences. As these drugs are ineffective, they increase medical costs, slow down recovery,
and lead to a subsequent loss of productivity. Drug resistance, an issue exacerbated by low-
quality medicines, reduces the effective lifetime of a medication, and society bears the cost
of developing new medications for previously treatable diseases. Furthermore, the presence
of illegitimate medications undermine confidence in national regulatory authorities, local
health systems, and public institutions more generally. Lack of consumer confidence in
drug quality is one proposed reason for the “branded generic” markets that arise in many
countries. Branding is a logical response by producers to consumer quality uncertainty
– brand names in conjunction with advertising can provide consumers a signal of quality
and a means to cease purchase of low-quality products (Akerlof, 1970). However, price
2Among these, in 2014 officials in the Indian state Chhattisgarh withdrew antibiotic pills, thought to be
contaminated with rat poison, after at least 15 reported deaths (Raj and Barry, 2014).
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competition is dampened when a traditionally non-differentiated product, such as generic
medication, competes on brand name. Thus, the lack of consumer confidence in drug qual-
ity can have a broader negative impact on price competition in off-patent pharmaceutical
markets. Last, the sale of counterfeit medication often goes to fund criminal activities –
one more negative social impact of illegitimate medications (Buckley and Gostin, 2013).
3.1.3. Evidence on Prevalence of Illegitimate Drugs in LMICs
It is difficult to measure the global extent of illegitimate drugs. Often, physicians and pa-
tients are not able to determine a drug’s quality, even after use. Most of the evidence about
the prevalence of low-quality medicines available comes from convenience samples, which
may provide biased estimates of the prevalence of illegitimate drugs. The best evidence
available comes from randomized samples of drugs available on the market, of which few
exist. This chapter will detail published evidence on drug quality collected from randomized
samples, which is summarized in Table 1.3
A randomized study of drug quality in urban Nigeria by Taylor et al. (2001) found widespread
drug quality issues. The authors collected 581 samples of 27 different drugs from 35 ran-
domly selected registered pharmacies. Using British Pharmacopoeia standards, the authors
found that, of the collected medications, 279 of 581 (48%) overall samples failed quality
testing. Breaking these results down by category of drug, 14% of anthelmintic, 41% of
antibacterial, 17% of antifungal, 42% of antimalarial, and 54% of antituberculosis active
ingredients were outside of British Pharmacopoeia allowable ranges.
In 2005, Kaur et al. (2008) collected a systematic random sample of antimalarial medica-
tions in Tanzanian retail outlets, including pharmacies, drug stores, general stores, kiosks,
hawkers, and supermarkets. In this analysis, the authors collected 1,080 antimalarial sam-
ples from 2,474 vendors, of which a 882 were deemed eligible for analysis. Of these, 301
were systematically randomized for chemical analysis and compared to U.S. Pharmacopoeia
3Due to sample size concerns, this chapter will limit the analysis to studies with a sample size of at
least 100. While not detailed in this chapter, Buckley and Gostin (2013) provide an overview of published
evidence on drug quality obtained from convenience samples.
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standards. A total of 38 of these 301 failed quality testing (12.2%), but none of these 301
tested samples was a pure fake (e.g. had no active ingredient).
A 2009 study of antimalarial quality in southeastern Nigeria expanded on precious analyses
by sampling medications from both licensed and unlicensed private medicine dealers across
urban and rural areas (Onwujekwe et al., 2009). Despite suspect quality, the authors
note that the informal sector of unlicensed dealers is a main source of antimalarials in
Nigeria. The authors tested 225 drug samples from a mix of patent medicine dealers,
pharmacies, public hospitals, and private hospitals. Of these medications, 27% (60 of 225)
fell outside of U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards and failed quality testing. Medicines collected
from unlicensed dealers were more likely to fail quality testing than medicines from licensed
facilities, and made up the majority of substandard medication samples.
Between 2008 and 2009, Bate et al. (2009) tested a sample of antibiotic, antimalarial, and
antimycobacterial drugs collected from randomly chosen pharmacies in the Indian cities of
New Delhi and Chennai and found that 8.5% of medications were low quality (12% from
New Delhi pharmacies and 5% from Chennai pharmacies). Fewer than 4% (11 of 281) of
samples in Delhi and less than 1% (2 of 260) in Chennai had zero or very little active
ingredient. While country of origin may have been misspecified, all but four substandard
medicines listed India as the country of origin. The remaining four substandard medicines
were listed as being produced in the United States, but this was likely false as these products
contained no active ingredient, indicating likely counterfeits.
In 2010, Stanton et al. (2012) collected a sample of injectable uterotonics (medications
used for obstetrics, including postpartum hemorrhage) from three districts in Ghana and
tested them in reference to British Pharmacopoeia standards. This sample included 55
samples of ergometrine ampules, of which none were within British Pharmacopoeia limits,
and 46 oxytocin ampules, of which 11 (26%) were within British Pharmacopoeia limits. On
average, these samples contained 50% and 64% of the listed active ingredient, respectively,
for the ergometrine ampules and the oxytocin ampules.
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Table 1: Existing Evidence from Randomized Evaluations of Drug Quality in LMICs
33
Outside of random samples, a number of recent papers by Roger Bate and co-authors use
convenience samples where secret shoppers are sent into pharmacies in a range of LMIC
cities to measure both prevalence of substandard and counterfeit medications as well as
correlates to substandard medicines. Among these are two studies examining the correlation
between drug quality and pricing. Bate et al. (2011) collected a sample of eight drugs
from 17 LMICs and found that approximately 15% of collected medicines failed quality
testing. Further, the authors found that drugs that failed this testing were priced 13.6-
18.7% lower than passing drugs, indicating that price was associated with failure rate but
not by itself a reliable signal of quality – there was a large overlap in prices between passing
and failing drugs. Further, the authors found that a pharmacy’s appearance as measured
subjectively by secret shoppers was weakly correlated with drug failure rates. Bate et al.
(2015) performed a similar analysis, testing a sample of 1,437 samples of ciprofloxacin from
18 LMICs, finding that 9.88% had less than 80% of the listed active ingredient, with 41.5%
of these failures having no active ingredient (falsified medicines). As in Bate et al. (2011),
the authors find that substandard drugs are on average cheaper than passing generics in the
same city, however they find that falsified medicines were not priced significantly differently
than passing drugs on average, suggesting mimicry of higher-quality producers.
In addition to correlates to pricing, a second set of papers by Roger Bate and coauthors
examine the correlation between drug quality and both country of origin and country of sale.
Bate et al. (2012) examine drug failure rates for products approved by a stringent regulatory
authority (SRA) or WHO prequalification program, to see if these prequalification programs
help ensure high-quality products.4 The authors examine 2,642 samples of medication from
the WHO’s essential drug list collected from 17 LMICs. They find that 1.01%, 6.80%, and
13.01% of SRA-approved products, WHO-approved products, and products not approved
4SRAs are national drug regulatory authorities that are members, observers, or associates of the Inter-
national Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use. These include regulatory bodies in the European Union, Japan, and the U.S.
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by either SRAs or the WHO, respectively, failed quality testing. Further, the authors
show that there are significant differences in product failure rate depending on country of
origin. Products manufactured in Africa had the highest failure rate (25.77%), followed
by Chinese products (15.74%), Indian products (3.70%), and last by European/American
products, which were least likely to fail quality testing (1.70%). In related work, Bate et al.
(2016) assess the quality of 1,470 antibiotic and tuberculosis drugs that were advertised as
being produced in India and collected from Africa, India, and non-African middle-income
countries. The authors hoped to test whether Indian manufacturers cut corners for drugs
sold in markets with little to no regulatory oversight, specifically African markets. They
found that the overall medication failure rate was 10.9%, but the distribution of failing
products was non-random – failure rates in African countries were higher, even controlling
for manufacturer-drug fixed effects. Using a similar methodology to the previous papers,
Bate and Mathur (2018) collected a sample of 687 ciproflaxacin samples from 10 countries
in Latin America. The authors found that 7% of collected samples failed quality testing.
Of these substandard medicines, the majority were substandard as opposed to falsified –
only 26% of the drugs that failed quality testing had no active pharmaceutical ingredient.
Products that were locally registered were more likely to pass quality testing, and, as with
Bate et al. (2012), products with WHO or SRA pre-qualification were more likely to pass
quality tests. Interestingly, this study also finds that country-level corruption levels were
key predictors of drug failure rates, with more corrupt countries having higher drug failure
rates.
Last, the Indian government has conducted its own analysis of the prevalence of substan-
dard, or “not standard quality” (NSQ) drugs in the Indian market, using large sample sizes.
While at least one of these analyses has received criticism, as the government warned retail-
ers they would visit and collect medication samples ahead of time, they nonetheless provide
a broad picture of changing substandard medication rates in the country. These studies
find improving medicine quality over the years - 11% of drugs were NSQ in 2009–2010, but
this drops to near 3% in 2014–2016. The 2014-2016 wave of the study found differences in
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quality by state, with state-level NSQ rates ranging from 0.00-8.82%, as well as differences
in quality by point of sale. While only 3% of drugs collected from retail pharmacies in the
private sector failed quality testing, 10.2% of drugs in the government supply chain were
found to be substandard. This could be due to the fact that the government often uses ten-
dering processes to procure medications at the lowest possible prices. If such a tendering
process does not come with checks or assurances of quality, the companies that win con-
tracts may be the ones that reduce prices by cutting corners and reducing quality-control
expenses.
Year Estimate Detail Source
2009–2010 11.0% N/A Gujarat FDCA
2010–2011 7.1% N/A Gujarat FDCA
2011–2012 10.5% N/A Gujarat FDCA
2012–2013 5.6% N/A Gujarat FDCA
2013–2014 5.8% N/A Gujarat FDCA
2014–2015 4.6% N/A Gujarat FDCA
2015–2016 4.9% N/A Gujarat FDCA
2014–2016 3.2% 3.0% of retail drugs NSQ, 10.2%
of government supply chain NSQ;
0.0245% Spurious; State-level differ-




† Estimates from the Gujarat FDCA are sourced from Das (2016). Estimates from the National
Institute of Biologicals are sourced from National Institute of Biologicals (2016).
Table 2: Not Standard Quality (”NSQ”) Estimates from the Indian Government
3.2. Empirical Evidence on Medicine Quality from India
This section will present new empirical evidence on medicine quality from the Indian mar-
ket. Unlike previous literature, this analysis will focus on characteristics of firms that are
producing low-quality medications and locations where low-quality medications are being
produced.
As noted in Buckley and Gostin (2013), quality control costs are high – both upfront
fixed costs (e.g. manufacturing facilities) and variable costs of production (e.g. batch
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testing). Multinational firms operate on a scale that may allow them to recoup these costs,
however, smaller, local manufacturers – even those with good intentions – may not have
the capacity to support high-quality production. The significant pricing differences between
firms producing the same medications – discussed in further detail in Chapter 5 – indicate
that consumers perceive some quality differences. Despite all this, it is unclear if such quality
differences exist in reality. Firms often have multiple manufacturing plants, and these do
not always meet the same regulatory requirements. For instance, a manufacturer might
have a U.S. FDA approved manufacturing plant, a separate World Health Organization
Good Manufacturing Practice (WHO GMP) approved plant, and a third manufacturing
plant that meets Indian manufacturing requirements, which are generally considered less
stringent. While these standards should all guarantee a high-quality product, they require
different levels of paperwork and oversight. Thus, even if a manufacturer is capable of
producing medications to any regulatory standard, the products they sell in the Indian
market may not be meeting the same standards as the products they export.5
This section will proceed with a description of the data used in this analysis, results from
the analysis, and end with a discussion of results and their implications.
3.2.1. Data
To assess whether producer type and state of production are associated with drug quality,
this analysis makes use of a unique set of data from the Food and Drugs Control Adminis-
tration (“FDCA”) of India. The FDCA collects a randomized sample of drugs at various
points of the drug pipeline (direct from manufacturers, wholesalers, pharmacists, and gov-
ernment hospitals) and tests these drugs for a wide range of quality characteristics to ensure
they meet Indian Pharmacopoeia standards. This data is collected over time and includes
brand name, batch number, date and location of sample collection, and manufacturer name
and location. If a drug fails testing, the FDCA penalizes the producing company, sends a
5A caveat to this line of reasoning lies in liability laws. While multinational firms often have Indian
subsidiaries and operate local manufacturing plants, they are still liable for adverse events under U.S. or
E.U. liability laws.
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text message to all registered pharmacists with the drug name, manufacturer name, and
batch number, and additionally publishes the manufacturing information for drugs that fail
quality testing on a website available to the public for a period of six months.6
The data used to determine a company’s quality level and state of production comes from
two sources of FDCA data. The first data source is the full set of drugs which failed
FDCA quality control testing between 2010 and 2015, which was scraped over time from
the publicly available website. The second source of FDCA data is a set of full testing data
– which includes information on drugs that both passed and failed quality testing – for a
group of field offices between 2013 and 2014.
For the analysis, manufacturers are divided into three groups. First are originator pro-
ducers, or multinational firms that develop new medications, referred to as “multinational”
firms moving forward. These are defined in the data as firms whose headquarters lie outside
of India. The second group are exporting generics producers, or generics firms who operate
on a multinational scale, referred to as “exporter” firms moving forward. They are defined in
the data as firms with at least one WHO GMP plant. Large institutional procurement agen-
cies that operate internationally and countries purchasing bulk medicines generally require
products to meet WHO GMP standards, thus this classification signifies that a company is
likely to export products. Data on WHO GMP plant approvals for Indian producers comes
from the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization, a department of the Indian gov-
ernment’s Ministry of Health & Family Welfare. The department publishes a report “WHO
GMP Certified Manufacturing Units for Certificate of Pharmaceutical Products (COPP) in
Various States of India” which contains names and addresses of all WHO GMP Certified
manufacturers in India (Central Drugs Standard Control Organization, 2015). The third
and final group of firms are referred to as “local” firms and consist of generics firms that
only sell within India. These firms are defined in the data as firms headquartered in India
without at least one WHO GMP plant approval.
6The current link to this website is available here: http://xlnindia.gov.in/gp failedsample.aspx.
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The analysis also considers an alternative grouping of firm types, classifying firms by their
average prices into more expensive and less expensive producers. Defining firms as high- or
low-priced is difficult given that firms choose to enter different pharmaceutical markets. To
create a comparable definition of high- or low-priced manufacturers, this analysis merges
the data on producer quality with a database of Indian pharmaceutical retail sales data
and pricing for the years 2010-2015 obtained from the All India Origin of Chemists and
Druggists (AIOCD) Advance Warning Action & Correction System, henceforth referred to
as the “AIOCD” data. To classify pricing at the firm level, this analysis first examines
each product market (where a product market is defined at the active ingredient-dosage-
formulation level) and examines whether each product is above or below the unweighted
average price in this product market (details of this process can be found in more detail in
Chapter 5). Then it aggregates a percentage across all product markets of how often a firm
is priced above the market average price. As this percentage is comparable across firms, it
allows classification of firms into terciles of low-, mid- and high-priced firms.
Both sources of FDCA data – the sample of full testing data and the full list of drug failures
– are essential to the analysis. Incorporating the sample of full testing data into the analysis
is essential because FDCA testing is not random at the manufacturer level. This is not sur-
prising for two reasons. First is that the FDCA samples at the product level, versus at the
firm level, thus larger firms should be more likely to appear in the data. Second, the FDCA
samples from manufacturing plants, in addition to retail settings. Thus, firms more likely
to register with the FDCA – both multinational and exporter firms – may be more likely to
appear in the FDCA sampling data. Table 3 presents results of a Poisson regression esti-
mating how often a company’s products will be tested by the FDCA. The outcome variable
is count of times a company’s products appear in the sample of full FDCA testing data,
and independent variables include the following company characteristics: logged total sales
value, percentage of products priced below the price ceiling, number of unique products a
company produces, and company type. The analysis estimates a Poisson regression in place





Logged Total Sales Volume 0.338∗∗∗
(0.036)
% of Products Under Ceiling -2.784∗∗∗
(0.782)










Table 3: Likelihood of a Company’s Product Being Tested by the FDCA
These results indicate that larger firms are more likely to be sampled, as are more expensive
manufacturers. Even accounting for this, exporter firms are the most likely to be sampled
by the FDCA, and local firms are the least likely to be sampled by the FDCA.
Drugs fail quality testing for a variety of reasons – some more severe than others. Table 4
presents reasons listed by the FDCA that a drug did not meet Indian Pharmacopoeia
standards for a random sample of 296 drugs. The most common reason for failing quality
testing was “content assay,” or not having the correct amount of an active ingredient. As
with most pharmacopoeia standards, India generally allows a range of active ingredient to
pass quality tests (e.g. 90-110% of listed active ingredient, though this range is more or less
narrow depending on drug), so failing drugs would need to fall outside of these allowable
ranges. On average, drugs that failed the content assay test had 47.4% (st. dev 42.3%,
range of 0-246.5%) of listed active ingredients. Following content assay, dissolution and
disintegration time were listed in 27.0% and 9.8% of failing drugs, respectively. While rare,
extreme reasons for drug failure are listed among these samples, including toxicity, inclusion
of glass particles, and nil content (e.g. a falsified medication).
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Reason for Failing Count Percentage
Content assay* 143 48.3%
Dissolution 80 27.0%





Particulate matter 6 2.0%
Nil content 6 2.0%
Capping, cracking, or related 4 1.4%
Sterility 4 1.4%
Water / moisture content 4 1.4%
Uniformity of weight 3 1.0%
Missing some active ingredients 3 1.0%
Contains non-listed active ingredient 3 1.0%
Microbial limit tests 2 0.7%
Glass particle 2 0.7%
Sulphated ash 2 0.7%
Refractive Index 1 0.3%
Toxicity 1 0.3%
Salisytic acid test 1 0.3%
Loss on drying 1 0.3%
Total** 296 100.0%
*The mean value of listed active ingredient(s) was 47.4% (st. dev 42.3%),
with a range of 0-246.5%.
**A number of drugs failed on multiple categories, thus adding the counts
or percentages will not equal the total.
Table 4: Listed Reasons for Failing Drug Quality Testing
41
3.2.2. Quality Differences by Producer Type
Table 5 presents results on quality derived from the FDCA data. Of the 865 companies in
the AIOCD retail data, 230 show up in the FDCA data. Column (1) presents the average
number of times a company’s products show up in the data on drug failures collected by
the FDCA, and Column (2) presents the average number of times a company’s products
show up in the sample of FDCA testing data. Column (3) shows the ratio of average drug
failures to average drug tests for each company type. Local companies have the highest ratio
of drug failures to drug tests at 1.8, while exporting and multinationals firms have ratios
less than half that size, at 0.89 and 0.67 respectively. It is worth noting that confidence
intervals on these figures are quite high, largely due to the high number of zeros in the data,
but nevertheless this data does point to differential quality levels between these three firm
types. As the ratios in Column (3) are relatively meaningless, Column (4) computes the
estimated drug failure rates for each company type. This estimated failure rate is calculated
by dividing the figures in Column (3) by 20, as the sample of testing data is approximately
5% of the total testing data for the 2010–2015 time period. This percentage clearly shows
large differences between firm types – local firms are more than twice and three times as
likely to fail quality testing as compared to exporter and multinational firms, respectively.
This quality differential is correlated to firm pricing, as the AIOCD data indicates that
multinational firms are priced on average 29% more than local firms, and exporter firms are
priced on average 15% more than local firms.
While the local, exporter, and multinational firm classification is correlated to price, it
is also worth directly examining how likely high- and low-priced firms are to fail quality
testing. Table 6 defines firms as low-, mid-, or high-priced and examines how likely each
of these firm types are to fail quality testing. While standard errors are, again, large, this
chart shows that low-priced firms are the most likely to fail quality testing, while high-
priced firms are the least likely to fail quality testing. These results are in line with Bate











Local 0.20 0.11 1.82 9.09%
(0.67) (0.41) (6.11)
Exporter 1.11 1.25 0.89 4.44%
(1.44) (1.72) (1.58)
Multinational 0.52 0.78 0.67 3.33%
(1.06) (1.72) (1.58)
† Average number of failures is measured as the average number of times a manufacturer’s prod-
ucts appear in the FDCA “not standard quality” drug data. If a manufacturer does not appear
in this data, it is included in the calculation of the average as showing up zero times.
*Average number of tests is the average number of times a manufacturer’s products appear in
the full sample of FDCA testing data. This sample is approximately 5% of total testing data
for this time period.
Table 5: Average Product Failure and Test Rate by Firm Type
with quality for substandard medicines, but price in itself is not enough to definitely signal
quality.7.
It is interesting to note that the ratio of failures to tests amongst local, exporter, and multi-
national firms show more variation than among low-, mid-, and high-priced firms, despite
the correlation amongst these two classifications. This could simply signal a continuous
range of values with different cut-off points,8 but may also point to something outside of
pricing being important in determining product quality. First are business constraints. As
mentioned earlier, multinational and exporter firms operate on a larger scale, which may
allow them to recoup the high costs of maintaining high-quality facilities. Second, multina-
tional firms are subject to U.S. or E.U. liability laws, which may be an influencing factor
on their decision to produce high-quality medicines. Further, multinational and exporter
firms make the majority of profits outside of India. They may work to ensure a higher-
quality product in India in order to reduce the likelihood of an scandal that could impact
7Bate et al. (2015) show that the prices of counterfeit medications do not follow this trend and instead
are likely mimic the prices of the product being counterfeited. As India largely suffers from substandard
medicines as opposed to counterfeit medicines, the trends shown above are in line with Bate et al.’s findings.
8Local firms make up 73% of the firms in the AIOCD data, exporter firms make up 21%, and multinational












Low-Priced 0.32 0.20 1.58 7.88%
(1.05) (0.70) (5.31)
Mid-Pried 0.40 0.34 1.17 5.85%
(0.91) (0.94) (2.79)
High-Priced 0.52 0.63 0.82 4.10%
(0.98) (1.39) (1.75)
† Average number of failures is measured as the average number of times a manufacturer’s
products appear in the FDCA “not standard quality” drug data. If a manufacturer does not
appear in this data, it is included in the calculation of the average as showing up zero times.
*Average number of tests is the average number of times a manufacturer’s products appear in
the full sample of FDCA testing data. This sample is approximately 5% of total testing data
for this time period.
Table 6: Average Product Failure and Test Rate by Average Firm Price
international sales.
3.2.3. Results by State of Production
Another component worth examining is whether different Indian states produce higher- or
lower-quality products. This captures more than just firm-level quality as larger firms are
likely to have multiple production plants across different states in India, which, as mentioned
earlier, may be set up to meet different manufacturing standards (e.g. Indian, U.S. FDA,
or WHO GMP). Qualitative interviews with stakeholders in the Indian pharmaceutical
industry conducted during the summer of 2014 indicated that certain geographic areas were
known for having lower regulatory oversight. A few of the drug samples in the FDCA data
were manufactured outside of India, however the vast majority were manufactured within
the country – even amongst multinational firms, which often have local manufacturing
plants used to produce medication for the Indian market.
The map in Figure 1 shows drug failure rates by manufacturing state. There are clear
differences by state of production, with estimated failure rates ranging from 0.00% in Orissa
and Sikkim to 11.88% in Punjab. There is a loose correlation between Northern states and
higher drug failure rates, though drugs manufactured in Tamil Nadu in the South also have
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Figure 1: Estimated Drug Failure Rate by State of Production
higher than average failure rates (5.83%).9
In order to determine correlates to drug failure rates by state of production, this analysis
next examines correlations between estimated state-level corruption indices and state-wise
ease of doing business estimates. Figure 8 in the Appendix presents state-level corruption
levels estimated by Charron (2010). The drug failure rate by state is not significantly
9Estimated failure rates are taken by multiplying the denominator of the ratio of failures to tests by 20 to
account for the fact that the testing data analyzed here accounted for approximately 5% of the total testing
data.
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correlated with this measure of state-level corruption (correlation: 0.016, p-value: 0.95),
nor is it significantly correlated with measures of state-wise corruption from the 2017 CMS-
India Corruption Study (CMS Research House, 2017).
An alternative consideration is that business or economic factors, rather than corruption,
are driving the production substandard medications, for instance through differential ability
to obtain business improvement loans. India as a country ranks low on the World Banks’s
Ease of Doing Business list – currently 142 of 189 countries (World Bank Group, 2015),
suggesting that business difficulties could be significant. A recent World Bank collaboration
provided statewise measures of ease of doing business in India, breaking this broad measure
into a number of contributing sub-areas (Make in India et al., 2015). Two sub-areas that
might be particularly relevant to the production of substandard medications are “carrying
out inspections” and “setting up a business,” which includes ability to obtain initial start-up
loans. Overall ease of doing business in a state was not correlated with drug failure rates
(correlation: 0.068, p-value: 0.78), nor was ease of carrying out inspections (correlation:
-0.082, p-value: 0.73). However, statewise drug failure rates were significantly correlated
with ease of setting up a business (correlation: 0.45, p-value: 0.049). Though this could be
a spurious correlation given missing data in some states, it is an interesting finding as it
indicates that substandard drug rates were highest in states where it is easiest to set up a
business.
3.2.4. Discussion of Results
The FDCA data from India provides a unique window to understanding whether or not
there are firm-level differences in production quality. The analysis indicates that firms that
operate on a global scale – both multinational firms and exporting Indian generics firms
– produce higher-quality products on average as compared to local generics firms. This
could be due to scale of production, where larger firms are better able to recoup the high
costs of maintaining high-quality production facilities. Alternatively, firms that operate on
a global scale may be punished in ex-Indian markets, which often comprise a majority of
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their profits, for a scandal involving low-quality products in the Indian market. Further,
firms may maintain a higher quality level if they believe that this is observable to patients or
physicians, and will allow them to charge a higher price. Indeed, an alternative definition
of firm type, where firms are classified as high-, mid- or low-priced likewise finds that
high-priced firms produce higher-quality medications on average, while lower-priced firms
produce lower-quality medications on average.
There was no significant correlation between the corruption level in a drug’s state of pro-
duction and likelihood of that drug failing quality testing. This could occur for two reasons
- first, the tests conducted here are not sufficient to pick up such a connection, or second,
factors other than corruption are leading to substandard medications. On the first point,
the corruption measures used in the analysis are broad and may not be representative of
corruption that is specific to pharmaceutical production and oversight. On the second
point, corruption in itself may not contribute in major ways to substandard medications.
If smaller firms are not able to meet quality standards due to inability to receive business
improvement loans or inability to recoup costs, then substandard medicines are due to eco-
nomic and business causes, as opposed to corruption. While corruption levels may allow
substandard producers to continue production without major deterrents, this may not be
the root cause of substandard medications.
General state-level measures of ease of doing business and ease of obtaining inspections were
not correlated to average quality of medications produced within that state. However, there
was a significant positive correlation between ease of opening a business in a given state and
average quality level of medications produced within this state. This correlation signifies
that production quality is highest in states where it is most difficult to open a business.
This could indicate that low barriers for entry may encourage entry of low-quality firms,
or that high-quality firms have resources to open a business in more difficult settings – for
instance in areas where obtaining small-business loans is difficult.
One thing inherent in this analysis is that not all firms produce the same quality of medi-
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cation. Thus, it is important for policy-makers to consider firm quality when determining
how best to improve access and affordability of medicines for constituents. A policy that
encourages or selectively benefits low-priced producers may lead to a higher ratio of low-
quality medicines on the market, with the corresponding negative welfare impacts both to
individual patients and to society as a whole.
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CHAPTER 4 : Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Pharmaceutical Price Controls
Pharmaceutical markets are unique in the extent that their prices are regulated by gov-
ernments or payers. While price regulation can be used to fight inflated prices caused by
producer moral hazard in high-income countries (HICs) or non-competitive pricing driven
by branded generics markets in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), it may come
with non-negligible negative consequences. As an important example - price regulation has
the potential to reduce competition between producers, leading countries with high levels of
regulation to have the lowest generic market shares (Danzon and Chao, 2000). Examining
the theoretical impacts of price controls can provide regulators with information of potential
positive and negative consequences of implemented legislation, as well as an understanding
of the mechanisms driving these consequences.
This chapter will present a theoretical analysis of one important price control policy, phar-
maceutical price ceilings. It begins with a simple theory of two vertically differentiated
firm types – an originator (branded, multinational) firm and a generic firm. This model
shows that both the originator and generic firms will decrease their price in reaction to
binding price ceiling legislation, even if the legislation is only binding for the originator
firm. Further, this model shows that price ceilings will dampen generic competition, in-
creasing market share and sales of the originator product. Last, the model shows that when
marginal costs are sufficiently similar between firm types that generic products will be most
likely to exit a market after implementation of a price ceiling. This two-firm-type model
is similar to the situation in a HIC country, but without incorporating insurance coverage.
Alternative theoretical models incorporate insurance coverage with coinsurance rates and
come to similar conclusions (e.g. Brekke et al. (2011).)
The two firm type scenario is not as relevant in LMICs, which are typically “branded
generics” markets, with multiple levels of product quality. To account for this, this chapter
next expands the theory to three producer types: a multinational producer (“multinational
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firm”), a local exporting firm with a strong reputation (“exporter firm”), and a less well-
known, small, local firm (“local firm”). Results from the two-firm-type scenario hold in this
setting. While all firms will decrease their price in response to a binding price ceiling, the
high-quality multinational firm should gain market share and sales given constant quality
parameters. Further, assuming marginal costs are sufficiently similar across producer types,
local firms will be most likely to exit the market after the implementation of a price ceiling.
The models in this chapter assume that quality levels are constant across time and that
firms do not shift their quality in response to price control legislation. In HICs, quality
differences between branded originator products and non-branded generic products are es-
sentially negligible due to bioequivalence requirements and stringent regulatory standards.
Nevertheless, some patients continue to purchase branded products at higher cost even af-
ter the entry of generics, suggesting consumers perceive a difference in quality. Regardless,
given regulatory standards that prevent modifications in quality levels, the assumption of
constant quality is justified. In LMICs, due to weak regulatory oversight and enforcement,
products do exhibit different quality levels, as discussed in Chapter 4. This is an important
distinction in many ways as a social planner or regulator must consider the health impacts
of these different quality levels when determining an optimal policy. The assumption of
constant quality in these markets can be justified in a number of ways. First, is that firm
types may be subject to different regulatory standards or liability standards which lead to
minimum levels of product quality that cannot shift. For major markets, such as Brazil
and India, multinational and exporting firms may have multiple plants meeting different
manufacturing standards (e.g. a plant approved by the U.S. FDA for products shipped to
the United States and a plant approved by the Indian Food and Drugs Control Administra-
tion for the Indian market), and this may not hold. However, multinational firms are still
subject to liability laws in their country of origin and both firm types may see international
reputation damage for any scandal involving drug quality, leading to a quality floor beneath
which these firms are not likely to shift. A second justification lies when price controls are
partial, and do not cover all products sold by a given producer. In these situations, firms
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are not likely to shift quality level if quality is in any way observable, as it could damage
their reputation in more lucrative markets where there are no price controls.
This chapter shows that binding price ceilings can be effective at lowering prices even for
firms pricing below the price ceiling ex-ante. However, these price ceilings can also encourage
use of the higher-priced medicines, which will increase in market share after price ceiling
legislation. In one way, this harms local businesses, which can have negative impacts on the
local economy. On the other hand, as higher-priced medicines are also higher-quality, as
shown in Chapter 4, this could have important positive health consequences for consumers.
4.1. Model of Two Firm Types
4.1.1. Laissez-Faire Market
Traditionally, off-patent pharmaceutical markets are assumed to have two product types –
a branded, originator product (referred to here as “originator” products), and a number
of less expensive generic products. There is a perceived quality difference between the
originator and generic products – in countries requiring bioequivalence tests, this could be
simply to advertising or familiarity – but regardless of the reason, the originator product
is able to charge a premium because there are consumers willing to pay that premium. In
this model and its extensions, firms will choose price second, after first choosing a quality
level.
The perceived quality difference between the originator and generic product is denoted here
by θ, where θ > 1. Consumers have different valuations of the drug itself, denoted by ν
which is uniformly distributed between [0, v].
The utility of a consumer buying product i is therefore:
Ui =

θν − po if i = o
ν − pg if i = g
where o indexes the originator product, g indexes the generic product, and po and pg are
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the originator and generic prices, respectively.
A consumer will be indifferent between the branded and generic product when po − pg =
ν(θ − 1). Assuming an open market, this provides the following demand functions:1
Do =





if 0 < po − pg < v(θ − 1)
1 if po ≤ pg
Dg =







if 0 < po − pg < v(θ − 1)
0 if po ≤ pg
It is plausible that the originator and generic manufacturers do not have the same marginal
costs.2 Assuming, therefore, that marginal costs, denoted as ci, are constant but differ by
producer type, producer profits become:
πi = (pi − ci)Di
Given these profit functions, a producer’s best-response functions in reaction to their com-
petitors price changes are:
po(pg) =
1




1The demand functions shown here do not allow for substitution decisions between different molecules.
This is a logical assumption as generally patients come in with a prescription, which negates the ability to
substitute between different molecules or dosages. However, substitution may of course happen over time, as
a patient expresses preferences to a physician and, in LMICs prescriptions are not always enforced. However,
Chapter 5 provides evidence that substitution between different molecules or dosages is not common in the
Indian market, even after price shocks.
2While there are unlikely to be different marginal costs for originator and generic products produced
in the same geographic area, these costs may be different if products are being manufactured in different
settings with different labor costs.
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It can already be seen here that the best response of a generic product is a price increase
(decrease) in response to an increase (decrease) in price by the originator product.
Substituting the best-response functions and solving for the optimal prices under the laissez-
faire market provides the following:
po =
2θ[v(θ − 1) + cg2 + co]
4θ − 1
qo = 1−
(2θ − 1)[v(θ − 1) + co] + (θ − 4)cg
(4θ − 1)v(θ − 1)
pg =
v(θ − 1) + 4cg + co
4θ − 1
qg =
θ[v(θ − 1) + co] + (θ − 8)cg
(4θ − 1)v(θ − 1)
The best-response functions also allow for estimation of the market share of originator








2θv(θ − 1)− po(2θ − 1) + θcg
(θ − 1)(2θv − po − θcg)
4.1.2. Price Ceiling Legislation
A price ceiling introduced into the market described above can take three forms: a ceiling
sufficiently high that it does not bind for either firm type, a ceiling that is only binding on the
high-priced originator firm(s), or a ceiling that is binding on both the originator and generic
firm(s). In the case of a non-binding price ceiling, the firm response is straightforward, as
prices, sales, and market share will remain at the laissez-faire levels in the short-term.
Assuming that the price ceiling was binding on just the originator firms, the originator must
solve a constrained maximization problem which is a simple modification of the problem
above. This leads to the following prices and quantities for originator and generic firms:
ppco = p̄ q
pc
o = 1−









where p̄ is the ceiling price. Though the generic product is not directly impacted by the
price ceiling in this situation, their best-response is to decrease their price in response
to the originator’s legislated price decrease. Even if the price ceiling is binding for both
the originator firm and the generic firm, the generic firm’s best-response would still be to
decrease price below the price ceiling assuming this does not push them below θcg, which
is the generic firm’s exit point.
The legislation will also lead to a quantity response amongst affected firms – assuming prices
ceilings are set above marginal cost, the originator product’s response to the legislation is an
increase in quantity supplied as compared to the laissez-faire market, whereas the generic
firm’s response is a decrease in supply.




− 2θ2(v − cg)
(θ − 1)(2θv − po − θcg)2
< 0
and thus the share of the branded product should increase post-legislation. Another way of
presenting this result is that stricter price ceilings will dampen generic competition. Even
if a price ceiling is set above marginal cost levels, it may lead to increased exit amongst
generics if sufficiently strict. The critical price ceiling which leads to generic exit is:
p̄ < θcg
Exit amongst multinational firms in this model will only occur if p̄ < cm. If θcg > cm, price
ceilings are more likely to lead to generic exit, even when binding only amongst multinational
firms. This would be the case when marginal costs for generics and multinationals are
sufficiently close (as is likely to be the case), or θ is significantly high.
4.2. Model of Three Firm Types
Most LMIC markets operate as “branded generics” markets, where generic equivalents
of originator medications compete using a brand name. These brand names allow firms to
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establish reputations for quality and differentiate themselves from other generic equivalents.
These markets will also have originator, branded products produced by multinational firms
and traditional non-branded generics, who do not invest in the same reputation-building as
branded generics manufacturers. As a result there are multiple levels of product quality or
reputation on the market.
This section shows that even when there are more than two levels of quality that all product
types will decrease their prices in response to a price ceiling – even if only the originator
product is directly impacted. To show this, this section defines a market with three product
types - a multinational branded product, a branded-generic produced by a well-known
exporting firm, and an unbranded generic produced by a smaller, local firm.
4.2.1. Laissez-Faire Market
Again, consumers have different valuations of a drug itself, distributed uniformly and de-
noted by ν ∈ [0, v]. In this scenario, the perceived quality difference of the multinational
drug is notated by α and the perceived quality difference of the exporter drug is denoted by
β, where α > β > 1. Given these parameters, the utility for a consumer buying a product
from producer i becomes:
Uθ =

αν − pm if i = m
βν − pe if i = e
ν − pl if i = l
where m indexes multinational companies, e indexes well-known exporting firms, and l
indexes local firms. A consumer will be indifferent between the multinational and exporter
product when pm − pe = ν(α − β), and will be indifferent between an exporter product
and local product when pe − pl = ν(β − 1). The multinational and local products will not
directly compete, but may indirectly impact each others strategies due to their impacts on
the exporter firms.
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2 [v(α− β) + pe + cm]
pm(pl) =
(α− β)pl + (2α− 52)(v(α− β) + cm) + (α− 1)ce
4αβ − α− 3β
pe(pm) =










(β − 1)pm + 2β(α− 1)cl + (α− 1)ce




It can already be seen that, under these market conditions:
δpi
δpj
> 0 for all i 6= j
While multinational prices and local prices do not directly impact each other, these firms
can indirectly impact each other through their influence on exporter firm prices.
In this market setting, the market share of branded products, again denoted as ω becomes:
ω =
v(α− β)− pm + pe
(v − pl)(α− β)
4.2.2. Price Ceiling Legislation
A price ceiling introduced into the market described above can take many forms: a ceiling
sufficiently high that it does not bind for any firm type, a ceiling that is only binding on the
high-priced originator firm(s), a ceiling that is binding on the multinational product and
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exporting firm product, or a ceiling binding on all firm types. In the case of a non-binding
price ceiling, the firm response is again straightforward, as prices, sales, and market share
will remain at the laissez-faire levels in the short-term.
If a price ceiling is binding on only the multinational firm, the multinational firm will drop
its price to the ceiling price, p̄. As in the case with two firms, given its best response
function, the exporting firm will drop its price in response to a mandated price decrease for
the multinational product. In response to the drop in price amongst the exporting firms, the
local firm will drop its price. Thus, even if the multinational firm is the only firm directly









(β − 1)p̄+ 2β(α− 1)cl + (α− 1)ce
4αβ − α− 3β
As p̄ < plfm, or the ceiling price is below the laissez-faire multinational price, all firm prices
are clearly below laissez-faire levels.
Demand for the multinational product in this market can be represented by the difference
in prices and quality levels between the multinational products and its direct competitor,




Though both products decrease price and quality levels are constant, as δpe/δpm < 1,
demand for the multinational product will rise post-legislation. This result will hold even
in markets where not all firm types are active, as shown in the short proof below.
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Proof that Multinational Firm’s Demand Will Rise
Case 1: Only the multinational firm is present in the market















Case 2: Only multinational and exporting or local firms are present in the market











Post-legislation, the multinational firm will lower their price to the ceiling, at price pc, and












and the change in pe with respect to pm is:
∆pe(pm) =
1
2(1 + α− β)
< 1
















Post-legislation, the multinational firm will lower their price to the ceiling, at price pc, and




















Case 3: All Firm Types are in the Market


















Post-legislation, the multinational firm will lower their price to the ceiling, at price pc,






















The increase in demand for multinational products leads to a corresponding increase in




(v − pl)( δpeδpm − 1) +
δpl
δpm
(pe − pm + v(α− β))
(v − pl)2(α− β)
< 0
Again, this result shows that an increasingly binding price ceiling dampens generic compe-
tition. Even when the price ceiling is only binding on multinational firms, critical points
for firms to exit markets are as follows:
Multinational firm exit will occur when: p̄ < cm
Exporting firm exit will occur when: p̄ <
ce(α− 12 −
β





Local firm exit will occur when: p̄ <
cl(2αβ − α− β) + (α− 1)ce
(β − 1)
Assuming marginal cost parameters are sufficiently close or quality parameters are suffi-
ciently different, a binding price ceiling on multinational firms is most likely to lead to
local firm exit - a somewhat counterintuitive finding. The assumption of relatively similar
marginal cost parameters is a valid one in many markets. It is not inherently more expen-
sive to produce the same molecule under a brand name versus a generic name. Further,
while quality assurance and reputation building come with associated costs, they are likely
to be associated with larger firms, which have market power to negotiate with suppliers and
better economies of scales than smaller firms.
An alternative way to think about this finding is that profit margins play into firm decisions
to exit markets post-legislation. As shown in Chapter 5, multinational products are priced
on average 28% more than exporter firms and 29% more than local firms. Exporter firms,
in turn, price products on average 15% more than local firms. Unless differences in costs are
larger than these pricing differences, it is multinational firms that have the highest margins,
and local firms who have the narrowest margins.
4.3. Necessary Conditions for Results to Hold
The model above makes several assumptions - which, while justified, may drive results.
This section will discuss implications of loosening two of these assumptions: the constant
marginal cost assumption and the uniform consumer distribution assumption.
4.3.1. Loosening the Constant Marginal Cost Assumption
A general assumption in models of the pharmaceutical industry is that of constant marginal
costs within a country (e.g. Brekke et al. (2011), Cabrales (2003), and Jack and Lanjouw
(2005)) or even zero marginal costs (e.g. Merino-Castelló (2003)). With respect to phar-
maceutical production these assumptions can generally be considered valid. However, an
important caveat unique to LMICs are rising costs of distribution with volume, largely
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driven by the high costs to reach rural areas. This is known as the “last-mile” problem,
with the last mile of the distribution chain being the most expensive. In rural areas of
LMICs the last-mile of the pharmaceutical distribution chain is disproportionately expen-
sive due to sparsely populated villages, lack of paved roads, and dearth of other necessary
infrastructure (e.g. cold chain capabilities and health facilities) (Buckley and Gostin, 2013).
While the model presented earlier already expands on previous analyses by allowing differ-
ent firm types to have different marginal costs, as may be the case in an LMIC market, it
does not allow for the increasing distribution costs.
Loosening the constant marginal cost assumption can have important implications on the
predictions from the model above, particularly with respect to volume responses by produc-
ers. As a simple illustration of how this might be the case, Figure 2 presents an illustration
of a monopolist’s demand and cost curves. This example shows that, if marginal costs are
rising with volume, you may see a decrease in supply after price ceilings are implemented,
even if firms are not price takers. In the first graph, PL and UL denote the laissez-faire mar-
ket price and quantity supplied by a monopolist producer. In the second graph, PC1 and
UC1 indicate the prices and quantities supplied at Price Ceiling 1 = PC1. This clearly leads
to an increase in supply. However, in the third graph, the price ceiling is set significantly
lower, at PC2. At this significantly lower price, quantity supplied shrinks to UC2 < UL.
Figure 2: Price Ceilings with Firm Market-Power and Increasing Marginal Costs
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4.3.2. Loosening the Uniform Patient Preferences Assumption
Following previous theoretical literature on pharmaceutical price controls (e.g. Brekke et al.
(2011)), the model presented above allows consumers to have different valuations of a drug,
denoted by ν, where ν is uniformly distributed between [0, v]. However, a distribution of
valuations may also be thought of as a preference for drug quality and is likely to be highly
correlated with income levels. As LMICs have, on average, higher income inequality as
measured by both Gini coefficients and Palma ratios (United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, 2016), this assumption may be less likely to hold in LMIC markets. Realistically
ν may be represented as asymmetrical, with a large mass of consumers on the low end of ν
and a long right tail.
Loosening the uniform distribution of ν to allow for the asymmetric distribution described
above may impact model predictions. While prices for all products will continue to drop
in such a distribution, the magnitude may be smaller or larger depending on the exact
distributional form of ν. Multinational market share and unit response, however, are both
ambiguous, depending on how the distribution form of ν shifts exporting firm responses.
Despite the mass of consumers on the lower end, the impact on exit remains when assuming
constant marginal costs.
4.4. Model Predictions
To summarize, a price ceiling can distort the laissez-faire market equilibrium by lowering
prices of not only directly-affected products, but also products priced ex-ante below the
price ceiling. Demand for the ex-ante high-priced, high-reputation products will increase,
and these products will see an increase in market share. Further, producer exit will not
necessarily result unless price ceilings are sufficiently low. However, if marginal costs are
similar across firm types, price ceilings are most likely to lead to exit of low-priced firms – a
somewhat counterintuitive finding as these firms are least directly affected by price ceiling
legislation. This set of findings leads to three testable propositions:
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Proposition 1 : Prices of products will fall amongst all firm types post-legislation, even if
these products were ex-ante priced below the set price ceiling.
Proposition 2 : Multinational products will see both an increase in sales and in market-
share post-legislation. However, when loosening constant marginal cost and uniform patient
preferences assumptions, the effect on multinational market share and sales is ambiguous.
Proposition 3 : Assuming sufficiently similar marginal costs across producer types, producer
exit is most likely to occur for small, local firms.
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CHAPTER 5 : Empirical Analysis on the Impact of Pharmaceutical Price Controls
on Medicine Prices, Sales, and Quality in the Indian Market
Lack of access to essential medicines is an important public health issue that dispropor-
tionately affects those living in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) (Laing et al.,
2003). The United Nations, recognizing the severity of this issue, listed providing access to
affordable medicines in developing countries as one of its Millennium Development Goals
(United Nations, 2015). In LMICs, where insurance coverage is low, medication prices may
be a major impediment to access for patients. Even when generic competitors enter LMIC
markets, medicine pricing is not necessarily competitive. Lack of quality assurance and en-
forcement of good manufacturing practices, as well as lack of bioequivalence requirements,
contribute to generic producers marketing with brand names, dampening price competition.
To combat non-competitive pricing in generics markets, India’s government implemented
market-based price ceilings on a set of essential medicines between 2013 and 2014. This
chapter will make use of a dataset of retail pharmaceutical sales and pricing data from India
between 2010 and 2015 to measure the varied impacts of this legislation, with particular
emphasis on differential impacts by firm type and product markets.
This chapter will proceed with a description of the empirical setting, methodology, and
results of the study, before ending with a brief discussion and conclusion.
5.1. Empirical Setting
This chapter examines the impact of price controls implemented in India between 2013 and
2014. The common conception of pharmaceutical price controls are reference prices or price
ceilings set by a government insurer for on-patent originator medications. The goals of these
price controls are to use payer monopsony power to lower high medicine prices arising from
producer monopoly power and consumer moral hazard due to insurance coverage. India’s
price controls differ from these in that they largely covered off-patent medications – an
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economically important difference in that multiple producers are typically active in these
price-controlled markets – in a market with low insurance coverage. These price controls
address a different market failure – a failure of the market to drive pricing competition
amongst generic drugs.
To fully address the background of these price controls, this section proceeds as follows.
Section 5.1.1 presents background on generic pharmaceutical markets globally and then
identifies how the generic market in India differs. Section 5.1.2 presents background about
the overall Indian pharmaceutical industry, with specific regards to different producer types
that operate in this market. Last, Section 5.1.3 details the price controls studied within
this paper.
5.1.1. Background on Generic Pharmaceutical Markets Globally and in India
Globally, once branded, originator products lose patent protection, generic competitors can
enter the market and compete with these products. To enter the market in high-income
countries, generic producers must conduct bioequivalence studies, which are much cheaper
than the expensive clinical trials required for proprietary medications. These bioequivalence
studies ensure that generic and proprietary medications have the same therapeutic proper-
ties – namely that the generic mediation is absorbed in the body at the same rate and in
the same amount as the originator product. Bioequivalent products are considered, at least
medically, the same and thus many countries allow pharmacists to substitute therapeutically
equivalent generic medications in place of more expensive proprietary medications.
As it is relatively inexpensive for generics to come to market, in a competitive market
there are often multiple companies producing generic versions of an originator medication.
In high-income countries, generics are generally sold as unbranded medications – meaning
they are sold by the generic molecule name (e.g. ibuprofen as opposed to the brand name,
Advil). To save the health system money on pharmaceutical costs, countries use different
methodologies to encourage generic substitution and pricing competition amongst generics.
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In the United States, for instance, patients are generally encouraged to accept a generic
medication through lower co-pays. Pharmacies are typically paid more to dispense generic
medications than branded products, encouraging them to substitute the generic medication.
Further, pharmacies are generally paid a fixed amount for dispensing a generic regardless
of the amount paid for the generic – thus, any cost savings on purchasing a cheaper generic
medication will accrue to the pharmacy, encouraging them to purchase the cheapest avail-
able version. This system both encourages substitution of cheaper generics in place of
originator medications, and drives pricing competition amongst generic producers.
India’s generics market operates very differently, and a number of factors dampen price
competition that might otherwise occur in a competitive off-patent pharmaceutical market.
While India does have a number of unbranded generics in the market, as with many LMICs,
it is primarily a branded generics market, meaning generics compete on brand name as
opposed to competing solely on price. Additionally, in India pharmacists are not allowed to
substitute generic equivalents by law.1 Further, pharmacies generally receive a percentage
of a product’s market price as their mark-up. Thus, a pharmacist selling a more expensive
product will likely receive a larger payment. The combination of these factors dampens
the price competition between different generic brands and between originator and generic
products.
Of interest to economists is how branded generics markets can occur in areas where con-
sumers are both highly price-sensitive and largely paying for medications out-of-pocket.
One primary reason these markets can exist is lack of confidence in generic bioequivalence
and, potentially, manufacturing quality (Danzon et al., 2015; Danzon and Furukawa, 2008).
Product brand names can serve as one “counteracting institution” against the impacts of
quality uncertainty, providing consumers both a signal of quality and a means to retaliate
against low quality products by ceasing future purchase (Akerlof, 1970).
1Current Prime Minister Narendra Modi has advocated changing this to have physicians write prescrip-
tions with a generic name, allowing pharmacists to dispense a less expensive product.
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In India, during the time frame of this study, only generics coming to market within four
years of the originator drug being approved in India were required to submit bioequivalence
studies.2 However, generics coming to market after this four year period only needed
permission to manufacture a generic from state licensing authorities, with no bioequivalence
studies required. Thus, companies selling generic medicines within India might wait until
the four-year period had expired and apply to state licensing boards in the fifth year, waiving
the necessity of conducting bioequivalence studies. While companies may have conducted
such studies, physicians and patients cannot be sure which generics have gone through
bioequivalence tests and which have not. Given India’s large export market, it is important
to note that generic firms exporting to other markets must follow the manufacturing laws
within those countries – thus Indian firms exporting to countries that require bioequivalence
trials must conduct these trials for exported products.
A further, closely related, issue is a potential lack of confidence in manufacturing quality
due to the presence of low-quality or even fake medicines in the market. This can occur due
to lax regulation and enforcement of good manufacturing practices, and leads to quality
uncertainty amongst consumers. A mistrust of pharmaceutical quality can logically lead
to a branded generics market, as producers can invest in establishing a reputation for
quality with patients and physicians. This clearly can dampen pricing competition – if
consumers are not confident about the quality of a locally-produced medication brand they
are unfamiliar with, then they might not want to purchase this brand even if it is cheaper.
Chapter 3 details evidence on the prevalence of substandard and falsified medicines in
markets across LMICs and within India specifically. The Indian government presents low
estimates of substandard medications averaging around 6% of drugs over the years 2010-
2015.3 However, even if incidents of harm due to substandard drugs are rare, if these
incidents are publicized in local news, consumers are likely to be aware of them and lack
2The Indian government amended laws in 2017 to make bioequivalence studies mandatory for certain
– but not all – classes of generic drugs (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2017). However, this
is proactive as opposed to retroactive and does not ensure the bioequivalence of products already on the
market.
3Table 2 in Chapter 3 details different estimates, which range from 11% in 2009-2010 to 3% in 2014-2016.
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confidence in drug quality.
5.1.2. Indian Pharmaceutical Market
The Indian pharmaceutical market is the third largest global market in volume and eleventh
largest in sales (QuintilesIMS, 2016), valued at $13.8 billion in 2012 (PwC, 2013) and
$16.2 billion in 2016 (Care Ratings, 2017). As of 2014, 4.7% of India’s GDP was spent on
health, 70% of which was from private spending (The World Bank, 2017). Estimates on
the percentage of total health spending towards pharmaceuticals in India vary by source,
but range from 17-31% of total health spending (Burns, 2014).4 Of the public expenditure
on health, only about 10% goes towards pharmaceuticals – however, there are significant
differences by state, with pharmaceuticals comprising less than 2% of public health spending
in Punjab and 17% in Kerala (Sakthivel, 2005).
Most medicines consumed in India are produced by the large, local generics manufactur-
ing industry, with multinationals comprising approximately a quarter of sales (additional
information about the retail market can be found in Section 5.2.2.). While there are an
incredible number of manufacturers within the country – India’s National Pharmaceuti-
cal Pricing Authority listed 10,563 total registered drug manufacturers in India during 2007
(National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, 2007) – over half of local sales are concentrated
amongst the twenty largest local generics firms (Aggarwal, 2011). The Indian pharmaceuti-
cal industry is also a large exporter of generic medicines, with an estimated $16.8 billion in
revenue from pharmaceutical exports in 2016 (Care Ratings, 2017). As such, exports make
up more than half of total revenues for the overall Indian pharmaceutical industry.
In India, the retail pharmaceutical supply chain flows from a pharmaceutical manufacturer
to a Clearing and Forwarding Agent (“CFA”). The CFA, in turn will sell to stockists (also
known as distributors or wholesalers), who in turn sell at a mark-up to retailers (generally
pharmacists), who sell at an additional mark-up to consumers. Unique to India is the
4However, these estimates may be understated - a 2005 expenditure survey conducted across Indian states
found that 61-90% of household out-of-pocket spending on health was spent on pharmaceuticals (Sakthivel,
2005).
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All India Origin of Chemists and Druggists (the “AIOCD”), a lobbying group for retail
pharmacists and wholesalers with significant influence and market power. Approximately
90% of pharmacists in India belong to the AIOCD, and the organization works on their
behalf to ensure a standardized minimum markup for retail pharmacists and wholesalers
in their lobbying organization – generally 20% of retail price for pharmacists and 10% for
wholesalers. On top of this negotiated retailer markup, pharmaceutical companies can
employ other measures to encourage pharmacists to prescribe their drugs, namely sales
representatives and free medication samples.
5.1.3. Price Control Legislation
India has a long history of regulating the prices of drugs and active pharmaceutical ingre-
dients, dating back to the 1960s.5 Prior to the legislation introduced in 2013, India already
had in place price controls on 95 active pharmaceutical ingredients (also known as “bulk
drugs”). Attempts by the government to reform and expand pharmaceutical price controls
were met by significant resistance from the local pharmaceutical industry, and with reason
– when the Indian government announced an intention to place price controls on essential
medicines in 2006, the stock prices of local pharmaceutical firms plunged (Aggarwal, 2011).
Despite industry resistance, India expanded pharmaceutical price controls in 2013, and
again in 2014. This study will examine the impact of these two sets of price controls, the
timeline of which is available in Figure 3. The first set of price controls were enacted when
the Indian government released the 2013 Drug Price Control Order, giving a local regulatory
body, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, the ability to place price ceilings on
formulations of the drugs in India’s National List of Essential Medicines. India’s National
List of Essential Medicines is based on the World Health Organization (WHO)’s List of
Essential Medicines, with adjustments based on local market characteristics. As with the
WHO List of Essential Medicines, it is common for only certain formulations of a given
molecule to be contained on the Indian National List of Essential Medicines.6 For instance,
5Figure 10 in the appendix details the history of price controls in India dating back to the mid-1900s.
6The process of selecting medicines to add to the WHO List of Essential Medicines has been criticized,
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the 250mg and 500mg dosages of amoxicillin, a commonly used antibiotic, are contained
on the National List of Essential Medicines, but another commonly used formulation – the
125mg dosage – is not. The Indian National List of Essential Medicines was first developed
in 1996 and is not updated regularly – it was publicly updated in July 2011, and was not
updated again until late 2015.
† National List of Essential Medicines is abbreviated here as “NLEM.” National Pharmaceutical
Pricing Authority, the government body responsible for setting price ceilings, is abbreviated here
as “NPPA.”
Figure 3: Timeline of Price Controls Used in Analysis
The 2013 Drug Price Control Order did not just place ceilings on essential medicines. It also
set retailer markup for price-controlled drugs at 16% for pharmacists and 8% for wholesalers,
lower levels than the industry standards of 20% and 10%. This cut in retail margins raised
significant furor from the pharmacist lobbying organization, AIOCD. Post-legislation there
were wide-spread reports of wholesalers and pharmacists insisting on the standard 10% and
20% markups – forcing at least some producers to meet these demands (The Times of India,
2013).
partially for this reason. See, for instance, Barbui and Purgato (2014).
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The National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority uses market-based mechanisms to set price
ceilings, with the rules depending on the number of drugs in a product class. Price ceilings
are set using price to retailer, which is the price the pharmacist pays for medication, as
opposed to maximum retail price, which is the price the manufacturer prints on the medi-
cation package. If there are multiple brands of drugs in a product class, the price ceiling is
calculated by first taking the unweighted average price to retailer for all drugs with at least
1% market share, and then a 16% retailer markup is added to determine maximum retail
price. If a drug is alone in its class, it receives a fixed-percentage price reduction based on
the amount price ceilings reduced prices for similar categories of drugs.
In September 2013, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority began publishing and
enforcing price ceilings for the 348 drugs on the National List of Essential Medicines. How-
ever, the process of setting price ceilings proved difficult with the large number of com-
petitors on the market, and thus the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority did not
announce all price ceilings at the same time, rather announcements of price ceilings were
made gradually over the following months.
While the 2013 pharmaceutical price controls were anticipated by the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, in 2014 the Indian government implemented a second set of price controls that
came as a surprise to the pharmaceutical industry. On May 29, 2014, the National Phar-
maceutical Pricing Authority issued an internal guideline which gave their organization
the right to place price controls on drugs not contained on the National List of Essential
Medicines if these controls were in the public interest. The memo justified this right by
citing Paragraph-19 of the 2013 Drug Price Control Order which “authorizes the Govern-
ment, in extraordinary circumstances, if it considers necessary so to do in public interest,
fix the ceiling price or retail price of any drug for such period as it deems fit” (National
Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, 2014b). Shortly after, on July 10, 2014, the National
Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority announced price controls of an additional 108 formula-
tions of diabetes and cardiovascular drugs not on the National List of Essential Medicines,
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citing the internal guidelines issued on May 29th of that year. This legislation incensed
the Indian pharmaceutical industry, which initially refused to comply with the legislation
and fought it in court. On September 29, 2014, courts ruled in favor of the pharmaceutical
companies and the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority withdrew the May 29th in-
ternal guidelines. However, this withdrawal was retroactive and not retrospective. In other
words, the price controls issued on July 10th remained in place, however moving forward
only drugs on the National List of Essential Medicines could be assigned a price ceiling.7
5.2. Methodology
This analysis makes use of the fact that the price controls implemented in India were partial
in nature to compare sales and pricing of price-controlled drugs to non-controlled drugs.
This section will describe the data used in the study, review characteristics of the Indian
retail market, and then describe in detail the estimation strategy used to measure the
impacts of the price control legislation.
5.2.1. Data Description
The primary data source used in this analysis is a database of retail sales data obtained
from the All India Origin of Chemists and Druggists (AIOCD) Advance Warning Action &
Correction System, henceforth referred to as the “AIOCD” data. This data is collected in
a joint effort between AIOCD, the national pharmacist trade union, and a private pharma-
ceutical research company. The data is collected electronically from a representative sample
of AIOCD’s member pharmacies and projected to national levels. Given that the data only
includes the retail market, it does not cover products sold primarily in hospital settings.
The AIOCD data is primarily bought and used by private companies to track market trends
in the Indian retail pharmaceutical market (AIOCD-AWACS, 2017). While the data is mar-
keted primarily towards private companies, it has previously been used in academic research
on the Indian pharmaceutical market (see for instance, Abrol et al. (2016); Mohapatra and
7India’s pharmaceutical industry fought to have the July 10th price controls revoked in court as well, but
in this case lost, allowing those controls to remain.
73
Chatterjee (2017); Bhaskarabhatla et al. (2017)). Importantly in this setting, the data also
served as one source of data used by the Indian government in setting the price ceilings
studied here.
The AIOCD data is available monthly from 2010 to 2015 at the stock keeping unit (SKU)
level. It contains information on drug brand name, manufacturing firm, drug dosage and
pack size (e.g. 4 pills), in addition to detailed pricing data that includes maximum retail
price (MRP), price to retailer, and price to wholesaler for drugs sold in the retail setting.
Data on price ceilings comes from the National Pharmaceutical Price Authority, the gov-
ernment body responsible for regulating pharmaceutical prices in India. The National
Pharmaceutical Price Authority publicly lists implemented price ceilings and the date they
went into effect (National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, 2014a). Generally, price ceil-
ings are published at the dosage strength (e.g. 25 mg) and unit/pack size (e.g. 1 pill or 1
ml) level.
This paper segments producers into three types for analysis: multinational companies, large
exporter firms, which typically export generics to other countries, produce branded generics
locally, and generally invest in reputation, and small local firms, which often sell in smaller
geographic areas, invest little in reputation, and produce a mix of unbranded and branded
generics. These firm types will be referred to respectively as multinational, exporter, and
local producers throughout the paper. Multinational companies are defined as being head-
quartered outside of India. To separate the large “exporter” firms from the smaller “local”
firms, this chapter identifies Indian producers as “exporters” if they have at least one World
Health Organization Good Manufacturing Practices (WHO GMP) Plant Approval. Large
institutional procurement agencies that operate internationally – such as UNICEF or the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria – and countries purchasing bulk
medicines generally require products to meet WHO GMP standards, thus this classification
signifies that a company is likely to export products. This classification is also highly corre-
lated with company size – all of the top 20 companies headquartered in India have at least
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one WHO GMP plant. Data on WHO GMP plant approvals for Indian producers comes
from the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization, a department of the Indian gov-
ernment’s Ministry of Health & Family Welfare. The department publishes a report “WHO
GMP Certified Manufacturing Units for Certificate of Pharmaceutical Products (COPP) in
Various States of India” which contains names and addresses of all WHO GMP Certified
manufacturers in India (Central Drugs Standard Control Organization, 2015).
5.2.2. Indian Retail Market Characteristics
The AIOCD data includes data on retail sales from 865 companies and 58,714 different
drug brands. Given that there may be multiple stock keeping units (SKUs) for a given
drug brand (e.g. there might be a 10-pack and 20-pack of the same brand, which would
each present as a separate SKU), there are a total of 103,067 unique SKUs in the data.
Despite a large number of competitors in generic markets – the median number of brands
in a given market is 5, but the mean is nearly 21 – markets are highly concentrated, as
shown in Table 7. The mean Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for firms is 48908, with
94% of markets considered to be highly concentrated.
Characteristics of Local, Exporting, and Multinational Firms
Table 8 details retail market characteristics by producer type. While exporting companies
make up only 21% of firms operating in the retail segment, they comprise 67% of sales.
Multinationals, while only 6% of firms, make up approximately a quarter of sales, and local
firms, while vast in number (73% of firms), make up less than 10% of sales. Not all producer
types are active in a given product market. An obvious case of this is on-patent medications,
where generally only a multinational firm is active. Multinational firms have only entered
38% of Indian product markets, while local and exporter firms have entered 49% and 73%
8This classification of HHI defines a market at the subgroup level, using the European Pharmaceutical
Market Research Association (EPhMRA) guidelines to define a subgroup. A subgroup is generally defined
as a molecule or molecule combination, e.g. ibuprofen or ibuprofen and acetaminophen. If the market
is expanded to a EPhMRA group level, the average HHI is 3347, with 65% of pharmaceutical markets
considered highly concentrated.
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Market Concentration Level Count of Markets Percentage of Market
Non-Concentrated 52 1.75%
Moderately Concentrated 125 4.21%
Highly Concentrated 2,790 94.03%
Mean HHI 4889.86
(3724.16)
† Markets are defined at the EPhRMA subgroup (generally molecule or molecule-
combination) level between 2010 and the implementation of price ceilings in
2013. Definitions of market concentration are those generally used to define
market concentration by the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission. These agencies generally consider markets with an HHI over
2,500 to be highly concentrated, and those with HHI between 1,500 and 2,500
to be moderately concentrated.
Table 7: Market Concentration Summary
Number of Firms Total Sales in MM Total Sales in MM
(Units) (Value)
Firm Type Count % of Total Total % of Total Total % of Total
Local 630 73% 9,167 8% 417,312 9%
Exporter 185 21% 74,906 67% 2,976,625 67%
Multinational 50 6% 27,124 24% 1,047,408 24%
Total 865 100% 111,197 100% 4,441,345 100%
† Summary statistics are aggregated from the AIOCD Awacs data between 2010 through
2015. Unit sales presented here are not standardized by dosage.
Table 8: Firm Count and Retail Sales in MM by Firm Type - 2010 Through 2015
of product markets, respectively. Table 9 details average logged prices, retailer mark-up,
monthly sales, and market share by firm type.
Though multinationals are in fewer markets than local firms, in the markets they enter
they tend to sell more units on a monthly basis and have a higher market share. Prices and
retailer markup are highest amongst multinational companies, and lowest amongst local
firms. These higher prices are not due solely to the different markets companies choose to
enter. Table 10 shows average price ratios for different firm types operating in the same
markets. In the same markets, multinational products are priced on average 28% and 29%
more than products manufactured by exporter and local firms, respectively, and products
sold by exporter firms are priced 15% more than those produced by local firms.
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Mean S.D. Min Max
Logged MRP
Local 4.05 0.88 -4.61 12.71
Exporter 4.23 1.19 -4.61 11.96
Multinational 4.55 1.47 -4.61 12.36
Logged Retailer Markup
Local 2.50 0.90 -13.86 11.10
Exporter 2.75 1.58 -15.25 11.23
Multinational 3.02 2.28 -14.56 11.67
Logged Sales Units
Local 6.58 2.25 0.00 15.28
Exporter 7.98 2.55 0.00 17.67
Multinational 8.21 2.77 0.00 16.30
Market Share
Local 3% 12% 0% 100%
Exporter 9% 21% 0% 100%
Multinational 18% 30% 0% 100%
† Numbers shown here are aggregated from the AIOCD Awacs
data between 2010 through 2015. Sales units presented here
are not standardized by dosage. Market share is shown at
the SKU-level.
Table 9: Summary Statistics by Producer Type
The pricing differences between firms producing the same medications indicate that con-
sumers perceive some quality differences. However, it is ambiguous whether these differences
exist in reality, as multinational and exporter firms often have multiple manufacturing plants
which meet different manufacturing standards. Thus, the products sold by multinational
and exporter firms on the Indian market are often subject to the same manufacturing stan-
dards as local medications. Chapter 3 presents evidence on drug quality in India and does
find differences by firm type – medicines manufactured by local producers were twice and





MRP 1.28 1.29 1.15
(0.83) (0.88) (0.69)
Markup 1.25 1.37 1.26
(1.04) (1.27) (0.85)
Sales Units 12.21 127.31 195.50
(32.93) (381.40) (693.05)
† Numbers shown here are aggregated from the AIOCD Awacs data between 2010
through 2015. Data is Winsorized at 1% to prevent results from being heavily
influenced by outliers.
Table 10: Price Ratio by Company Type
Characteristics of Price Controlled Products
Approximately 25% of the retail pharmaceutical market in India received a price ceiling
(21% in value). Table 11 shows the characteristics of uncontrolled and controlled products.
The products generally look similar, however the 2014 price controls took place in more
crowded markets (lower HHI), and covered only chronic products. Figure 4 shows pricing,
markup, and sales trends for non-controlled products and products given price controls in
2013 and 2014. Pre-trends for logged MRP and logged sales units are relatively similar for
each of these groups, with all products increasing price in the first quarter of 2012, and a
clear drop in prices can be seen in controlled products after the 2013 legislation was en-
acted. Pre-trends for logged retailer markup look relatively similar for non-controlled prod-
ucts and products price-controlled in 2013. However, logged retailer markup was trending
slower amongst products price-controlled in 2014 prior to the implementation of legislation.
Figure 5 presents market share over time for local, exporter, and multinational firms. While
multinational market share is declining across markets pre-legislation, the market share of
multinational firms stabilizes for price-controlled products after the legislation.
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Firm Type No Price 2013 Price 2014 Price
Controls Controls Controls
% of Market in Sales Volume 74.81% 22.47% 2.71%
% of Market in Value 78.74% 16.98% 4.28%
% Exporter (Volume) 65.70% 68.41% 76.14%
% Multinational (Volume) 24.94% 27.31% 18.46%
Market Characteristics - Mean and SD
Logged MRP 4.17 3.76 4.15
(1.13) (1.19) (0.80)
Logged Retailer Markup 2.64 2.27 2.62
(1.20) (1.29) (0.87)
Logged Sales Units 7.47 7.71 8.29
(2.54) (2.74) (2.35)
HHI 3015 3567 1340
(2365) (2999) (613)
SKU Launch Year 2008 2007 2007
(4.28) (4.32) (4.56)
Product Launch Year 2000 1996 2000
(5.06) (3.34) (3.99)
% Chronic 39.68% 31.39% 100%
(0.49) (0.46) (0.00)
† Statistics sourced from the AIOCD Awacs data for the time period between
January 2010 through May 2013, which is when the first waves of price ceilings
began. Sales volume and sales units are not adjusted for dosage. All values
are unweighted.
Table 11: Characteristics of Price Controlled and Non-Price Controlled Products
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† Data shown here are rolling averages due to seasonal nature of the data. Average sales units are
calculated at the SKU-level. Average and total sales units are not adjusted for dosage.
Figure 4: Time Series Trends for Logged MRP, Logged Markup, and Sales Units
Table 12 shows the average markdown required by the legislation for each company type.
Multinational firms see the largest required markdowns from ex-ante prices – an average of
|42 , versus |31 for exporter firms and |19 for local firms.
5.2.3. Estimation Strategy
The empirical strategy used in this study will compare changes in outcomes of interest
for products placed under price controls as compared to products not placed under price
controls. To assign the directionality of the legislation impact and ensure pre-trends will
































































Originator Market Share Over Time
(c)
† Market share is calculated at the product level, defined at the EPhMRA subgroup level.





Overall 4.7 4.2 -6.0
(36.2) (57.6) (65.5)
Above Price Ceiling -18.8 -30.6 -42.3
(36.6) (61.9) (72.8)
Below Price Ceiling 18.2 23.9 20.9
(28.2) (44.2) (43.1)
Percentage Difference
Overall 15.9% 16.2% 5.3%
(0.55) (0.58) (0.50)
Above Price Ceiling -22.7% -24.0% -27.3%
(0.20) (0.23) (0.23)
Below Price Ceiling 38.1% 39.0% 29.4%
(0.56) (0.60) (0.51)
† Markdown is calculated as the ceiling price subtracted by the average SKU market
price in the month price ceilings are adopted. Data is Winsorized at 1% to prevent
results from being heavily influenced by outliers.
Table 12: Price Markdown by Company Type*
treatment group interactions, as shown in Equation 5.1:
log(yit) = αmt + λdi + λmt × di + Bi + εit (5.1)
where mt are month-year fixed-effects, di is a fixed effect for price-controlled products, and
controls Bi include drug formulation (e.g. pill, liquid, inhalent), drug pack size (e.g. 10 ml
or 10 pills) and its square, firm type, a dummy for chronic drugs, product therapeutic class,
and the age of the product launched earliest in a given drug class. Outcomes yit include
maximum retail price (“MRP”),9 retailer markup (inclusive of samples and discounts), and
units sold. The coefficient of interest in this equation, λ, represents the interaction between
month-year and price-controls. If there are no pre-trends, then λ should be statistically
indistinguishable from 0 prior to the initial price control implementation in September 2013.
9MRP is the central measure of price to consumer, however it is an imperfect measure. MRP is the tax-
inclusive price printed on a medication box and is determined by the manufacturer. While the pharmacist
can offer discounts below the MRP, this cuts into their margin, which is 20% of the MRP in the retail setting.
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Results for this analysis are shown in Figure 6. It is clear from these graphs that after the
beginning of the legislation, noted with red lines in the graphs, prices, retailer markup,
and product-level sales begin to decline amongst price-controlled products with respect
to non-controlled products. The graphs show that pre-trends were similar across products
receiving and not receiving price controls, with one clear jump in pricing and markup trends
seen across all products in the first quarter of 2012. This jump does not correspond with
any announcement or implementation of price ceiling legislation, as detailed in Figure 3.
Instead, it corresponds with the timing of the significant price increases in the first quarter
of 2012. While the timing of this jump in trends does not correspond to announcement of
price ceiling legislation, it is not possible to rule out that the announcement of the legislation
contributed to this jump in pricing trends amongst price-controlled medications. Assuming
this was the case, it is clear how this finding would bias study results – impacts of prices
would be upward biased, with actual pricing impacts potentially lower, while impacts on
sales units would be downward biased, given the overstatement of pricing effects.
The assess the overall magnitude of the short-term effect of the legislation on price, retailer
markup, and sales units, the main analysis employs a difference-in-differences framework,
following the approach of Bertrand et al. (2004). The estimation strategy is shown in
Equation 5.2:
log(yit) = αmt + λsi + δcit + εit (5.2)
where outcomes yit include maximum retail price, retailer markup (inclusive of samples
and discounts), and units sold. SKU fixed effects, si, control for time-invariant differences
between SKUs, and month-year fixed effects, mt, control for market-wide time effects. The
binary variable cit indicates whether a given SKU has been assigned a price ceiling in a
given month-year. Thus δ, the coefficient of interest, measures the effect of the price control
legislation. Standard errors are clustered at the SKU-level to allow for serial correlation
and heteroskedasticity.
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Figure 6: λit For Logged MRP, Retailer Markup, and Sales Units
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term, as shown in Equation 5.3.10
log(yit) = αmt + λsi + δcit + ωcit ∗ vi + εit (5.3)
with a number of different interaction variables, vi. The first is a dummy for whether a
product is ex-ante priced below the price ceiling. Given that this variable is only available
for the treated drugs, for the control group of non-treated drugs, this analysis uses the
rules set by National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority as defined in Section 5.1.3 to define
artificial price ceilings for non-treated drugs. This allows classification of non-treated drugs
as being ex-ante below or above this artificial price ceiling. The second interaction variable
is a dummy variable indicating whether a given SKU is typically used for a chronic (versus
acute) condition. The last interaction term is firm type, with firms classified into three
groups: multinational, exporting, and local. A number of robustness tests are shown in
the appendix. These robustness tests are discussed in more detail throughout the results
section, but include regressions excluding products which exit during the time frame of the
study, results excluding low volume products, and results run separately by company type.
To identify the impacts of the legislation on originator market share, I estimate the following
fractional probit model:
E(sit|m, c) = Φ(β + αmt + δcit) (5.4)
where i indexes products, t indexes month-year, mt denotes month-year, cit denotes an
assigned price ceiling, and sit is the market share of originator, exporter, and local firms for
a given molecule (e.g. ibuprofen). To estimate this model using panel data, I follow Papke
and Wooldridge (2008) in using pooled quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) and
a generalized estimating equation (GEE) with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation. As in Papke and Wooldridge, I also estimate average partial effects
(“APEs”) with bootstrapped standard errors. Given that results are very similar, I only
10As company and product characteristics are time invariant and perfectly correlated with SKU fixed
effects, they only enter into the equation as part of the interaction term.
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present the GEE results within the body of the chapter. Alternative specifications for this
analysis can be found in the appendix, including a linear specification with fixed effects and
a two-period difference-in-difference analysis.
Last, to estimate producer exit, this paper estimates the following probit model at the SKU
and product-company levels:
E[Y |βXi] = β0 + β1ci + β2fi + β3ai + β4 × ci + β5ai × ci + Bi + εit (5.5)
where ci indicates a product received a price ceiling, fi indicates company type, ai indicates
whether a product is for acute or chronic use, and Y is an indicator variable for whether a
given SKU or company exits the market after September 2013, when the first legislation was
launched. Controls Bi are product age and drug formulation. In alternate specifications, I
add interaction terms between the price ceiling and market concentration, as measured by
HHI.
The key identifying assumption in the empirical strategy is that absent the price control
legislation, the price-controlled products would have trended similarly to the non price-
controlled products. Essential to this identification strategy is avoiding issues of “spillovers”
from the medications that received a price ceiling to those that did not.11 This is particularly
important given the design of India’s price control legislation, in which only certain drug
dosages and formulations received a price ceiling. Therefore, all analyses exclude drugs
in controlled therapeutic classes that did not receive a price control because these are
particularly likely to see spillover effects from the legislation and thus do not serve as a
clean control group. To identify these medications, products are categorized using the
European Pharmaceutical Market Research Association (EPhMRA) classification system,
with additional sub-groups included for products unique to the Indian market.
11This issue of “spillovers” has been raised in other markets with partial price controls – for instance,
Marks (1984) provides a discussion of this issue in the context of rent controls.
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5.3. Results
5.3.1. Evidence on the Impact of the Price Controls on Market Prices
Proposition 1 from the theoretical model in Chapter 4 predicts that in a vertically differ-
entiated market, all products will decrease their prices in response to a price ceiling, even
if the price ceiling is only binding on the high-quality, high-priced firm.
Results of the analysis on the impacts of price ceilings on market prices can be found in
Table 13. Column (1), which represents the overall effect of the price ceilings on logged retail
price, shows that prices of controlled products dropped by approximately 11.6% as compared
to the non-controlled market. Column (2) presents these results with an interaction for
chronic versus acute products, and shows that the largest price decreases were amongst
acute products. Column (3) shows these same results with an interaction term for company
type. As predicted by the model, the three company types all decrease prices in response to
the price ceiling. Unsurprisingly, multinational companies have the largest price decreases,
as their prices were ex-ante the highest and the price ceilings required the largest markdown
for these firms. As an alternative way of looking at these results, Column (4) includes an
interaction term for products that were ex-ante priced below the price ceiling. As predicted
by the model, even products priced ex-ante below the price ceiling decrease their price in
response to the legislation. Results in Appendix A.3.1 show that these findings are not
driven by producer exit and are robust to excluding small SKUs, to using all data, and to
running regressions separately for each company type.
Section A.3.3 in the Appendix analyzes the impact of the legislation on the prices of
“spillover” products, which are likely direct competitors of price-controlled products and
thus excluded from the main analysis. These results show a small but significant decrease
in the prices of spillover products post-legislation, suggesting that the mandated price de-
creases had wider reaching impacts even on products that were not directly impacted by
the legislation.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Effect Chronic Company Price Ceiling
Interaction Interaction Interaction
Logged MRP
Price Ceiling -0.109∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.054∗∗∗
(0.006)
Company Type
Exporter × Price Ceiling 0.012+
(0.007)
Multinational × Price Ceiling -0.054∗∗∗
(0.012)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling -0.004
(0.007)
Observations 2,656,065 2,428,764 2,656,065 2,656,065
Adj. R-squared 0.112 0.114 0.112 0.112
Logged Retailer Markup
Price Ceiling -0.148∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.072∗∗∗
(0.009)
Company Type
Exporter × Price Ceiling 0.034∗∗
(0.010)
Multinational × Price Ceiling -0.075∗∗∗
(0.017)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling -0.007
(0.010)
Observations 2,497,770 2,422,042 2,497,770 2,497,770
Adj. R-squared 0.0984 0.0995 0.0984 0.0985
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here. Products from
spillover groups are excluded from this analysis.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 13: Effect of Price Ceilings on MRP and Retailer Markup
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The results here indicate that Proposition 1 is clearly met. The price control legislation
lead to reduced prices not only for directly impacted products, but also for products priced
below price-ceilings ex-ante and for competitors of price-controlled products.
5.3.2. Testing Proposition 2: Evidence on the Impact of the Policy on Relevant Sales and
Market Shares
Table 14 presents results on the impacts of price control legislation on logged sales units.
As can be seen in Column (1) on the top panel, the overall impact of the legislation on
sales is an approximately 4.3% decrease at the SKU-level. Column (2) shows that this is
driven by a decrease in sales amongst acute products – products used chronically do not
show a change in sales. However, as can be seen in the lower panels, there are significant
differences by company type. Sales for local and exporting firms drop significantly after the
legislation, by 5.3% and 4.7%, respectively. However, amongst multinational firms, there
was no significant drop or growth in sales units overall. Only in chronic markets do product
sales increase, whereas there is a significant sales decrease amongst acute products. This
runs counter to the predictions of the model, which indicate that the multinational products
should see an increase in sales units. These results are robust to adjusting sales volume to
a standardized dosage, as described in Appendix Section A.3.2. Table 15 shows that the
decrease in sales was driven by local firms operating in markets that were highly impacted
by the price control legislation.
To understand this, it is important to look at the “spillover markets” – in other words
to look at potential substitutes for price-controlled products that did not receive a price
ceiling. Table 16 aggregates sales to the broader product12 level – combining sales of both
price-controlled and spillover formulations of products – and shows that in product markets
where even a portion of products received price ceilings, there is a significant 5.3% decrease
12For this analysis, I define a product at the molecule or molecule-combination level, regardless of dosage.
As an example, all dosage-formations of ampicillin, an antibiotic, would be one product market. However,
ampicillin is commonly sold as a combination drug with another antibiotic, cloxacillin - this combination






Price Ceiling -0.043∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.019)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.067∗
(0.026)
Observations 3,205,914 3,101,350
Adj. R-squared 0.0152 0.0153
Local Firms Only
Price Ceiling -0.053∗ -0.082∗∗
(0.024) (0.030)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.055
(0.048)
Observations 1,058,121 973,956
Adj. R-squared 0.0229 0.0234
Exporter Firms Only
Price Ceiling -0.047∗∗ -0.061∗
(0.018) (0.025)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.033
(0.033)
Observations 1,828,295 1,810,883
Adj. R-squared 0.0114 0.0115
Multinational Firms Only
Price Ceiling -0.052 -0.154∗
(0.048) (0.065)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.236∗∗
(0.085)
Observations 319,498 316,511
Adj. R-squared 0.0242 0.0246
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all
regressions shown here. Products from spillover groups
are excluded from this analysis.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 14: Effect of Price Ceilings on Logged Sales Units
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Local Exporter Multinational
Effect Only Only Only
High Impact -0.083∗ -0.189∗∗ -0.061 -0.067
(0.035) (0.073) (0.042) (0.102)
Mid-High Impact -0.018 -0.001 -0.016 -0.068
(0.037) (0.072) (0.047) (0.094)
Mid-Low Impact -0.036 -0.039 -0.028 -0.131
(0.022) (0.036) (0.029) (0.082)
Low Impact -0.041 -0.033 -0.069∗ 0.046
(0.022) (0.037) (0.028) (0.084)
Observations 3,205,914 1,058,121 1,828,295 319,498
Adj. R-squared 0.0152 0.0230 0.0114 0.0244
Table 15: Effect of Price Controls on Logged Sales Units by Market Impact
in sales post-legislation. This is explained by a lack of an uptick in sales amongst spillover
markets – which would be a logical result given the shrinking size of the price-controlled
markets. Section A.3.3 in the Appendix presents results of the effect of legislation on
spillover markets alone and shows that even though these markets have significant, though
modest, price decreases post-legislation, they do not see a corresponding growth in sales
post-legislation. Assuming pharmaceutical companies were trying to encourage substitution
to non-controlled formulations of price-controlled drugs, there should be an increase in sales
amongst these drugs, and empirically this is not evident.13
There are two likely explanations for this phenomenon. One of these is firm marketing and
promotional expenditures. Optimal advertising levels are dependent on the margins a firm
can earn (Schmalensee, 1972). As prices are forced below their laissez-faire levels, firms’
margins shrink and thus optimal marketing levels are likely to shrink as well. Marketing in
this setting can take the form of sales representatives,14 advertisements, and free samples
or discounts to wholesalers and retailers. As most of the products receiving a price control
13Appendix A.3.4 also shows estimates for classes of medications without close substitutes. These cate-
gories of medications may be less price-elastic, given the lack of ability to substitute to other medications.
Despite evidence of larger price decreases in these markets after price controls, the change in sales in these
markets post-legislation is non-significant though directionally negative.






Price Ceiling -0.053∗ -0.084∗∗
(0.024) (0.032)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.070+
(0.040)
Observations 179,275 179,203
Adj. R-squared 0.00322 0.00324
† Standard errors are clustered at the product level for all
regressions shown here.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 16: Effect of Price Ceilings on Sales at Overall Product Level
in this setting are not new, innovative medicines, an informational component may arise
through demonstrating a product’s quality, however it is unlikely to educate a pharmacist
or physician about the inherent benefits of the drug itself. If firm marketing is persuasive in
encouraging medicine use, and this marketing decreases post-legislation, this may – at least
partially – explain the decrease in sales. A corollary can be seen in evidence from high-
income countries on total (branded + generic) unit sales after patent expiration. Though
generic entry greatly lowers the average price of a drug, which should expand the drug’s
market size, the arrival of generics also leads to a significant reduction in advertising, which
works to counterbalance this effect. This explains why the total volume prescribed for a
given drug may actually decrease post patent expiration, despite the decrease in average
price (Caves et al., 1991).
A second potential explanation for the decreasing sales volume post-legislation may be due
to marginal costs rising with volume. Section 4.3 in Chapter 4 provides theoretical evidence
that if marginal costs are rising with volume, it may lead to a decrease in supply after
price ceilings are implemented, even if firms are not price takers. Given industry context,
marginal costs are often assumed to be constant in the context of pharmaceutical production
(for instance, see Brekke et al. (2011) and Cabrales (2003)), however in the Indian market
distribution costs are likely to increase with volume. Pharmaceutical distribution costs in
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India are very high – despite significantly lower labor costs, the cost of pharmaceutical
distribution in India is two to three times that in the European Union or United States
(Langer and Kelkar, 2008). In particular, supply chain costs are very high in rural areas, due
to what is known as the “last-mile” problem: the last leg of the pharmaceutical distribution
chain in rural India is disproportionately expensive due to sparsely populated villages, lack
of paved roads, and dearth of other necessary infrastructure (e.g. cold chain capabilities and
health facilities) (Buckley and Gostin, 2013). Even if pharmaceutical firms are not ceasing
production of price-controlled products, as the margins on these products are shrinking,
either firms or distributors may be pulling price-controlled products from sub-markets with
expensive distribution chains – which are most likely to be in rural areas. Exit from rural
sub-markets is particularly harmful as these areas already suffer from low access to medicines
– rural areas only contribute 21% of pharmaceutical sales in India (Langer and Kelkar, 2008),
despite 67% of the Indian population living in rural areas (The World Bank, 2016).
To assess whether advertising might be driving the decrease in sales, I examine the impact
of the legislation on one measure of marketing expenditure, bonus sales, which is the value
of free samples given to wholesalers and pharmacists. The first panel in Table 17 shows that
bonus sales decrease significantly – by over 50% – amongst price-controlled products after
the legislation. The second panel in this table shows that bonus sales decrease for spillover
formulations of price-controlled drugs as well, but to a much smaller extent. Table 36 in the
appendix examines the correlation between bonus units as a percentage of sales and sales
volume, controlling for SKU and month-year fixed effects. This finds a positive correlation
between bonus sales and product sales volume, but this is not causal evidence and there
are clear endogeneity concerns. Without causal evidence it is unclear if the decrease in
pharmaceutical marketing is causing the decrease in sales post-legislation, but given the
significant decline in marketing expenditure, it is one plausible cause.
To assess whether pharmaceutical companies pulled products out of costly rural sub-markets
post-legislation, I examine the impacts of the legislation on different subgroups of medica-
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Effect Local Firms Exporting Firms Multinational Firms
Price-Controlled Products
Price Ceiling -0.528∗∗∗ -0.898∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.078) (0.040) (0.127)
Observations 1,520,799 478,842 904,341 137,616
Adj. R-squared 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.327
Spillover Products
Price Ceiling -0.189∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗ 0.085
(0.034) (0.074) (0.039) (0.117)
Observations 1,521,547 488,266 896,904 136,377
Adj. R-squared 0.277 0.275 0.277 0.340
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here. Spillover prod-
ucts are excluded from the regressions on price-controlled medications and price-controlled
medications are excluded from the regressions on spillover medications.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 17: Effect of Legislation on Bonus Sales
tions. Prior to the implementation of the price control legislation, rural areas saw increased
sales in products likely to be prescribed by primary care physicians as opposed to specialists
– e.g. anti-infectives, pain medication, vitamins, and basic respiratory and gastrointesti-
nal medications (Kalsekar and Kulkarni, 2011; India Brand Equity Foundation, 2017). If
companies are pulling products from rural markets, then these therapeutic classes should
see the largest declines in sales post-legislation. Figure 7 shows the main results by ther-
apeutic class. Anti-malarials, anti-infectives, neurological and CNS drugs, analgesics, and
vitamins, minerals and nutrients all see a significant decrease in sales post-legislation. With
the exception of neurological and CNS medications, these are all classes of medications
more commonly used in rural areas prior to implementation of legislation. A second test
exploits the lack of cold chain connectivity to rural areas (Samant et al., 2007). Due to
lack of infrastructure and cold chain connectivity, products that require specialized storage
conditions are less likely to be available in rural markets prior to the legislation enactment.
Products with solid dosage formulations, such as pills or tablets, are less likely to require
such storage conditions as compared to liquid, injection, or inhalant formulations. Thus
if the decrease in sales volume were occurring primarily in rural settings, I would expect
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Figure 7: Effect of Price Controls by Therapeutic Class
“solid” product formations to have the biggest decrease in sales post-legislation. Table 18
shows results analyzing the impacts of price controls on sales separately by drug formula-
tion. This shows that solid formulations of drugs, such as pills and tablets, saw a significant
decrease in sales post legislation. Injections saw a semi-significant decrease in sales post-
legislation, while there was no significant change in sales units for inhalants or liquid drug
formulations. Though these results are not conclusive, they do provide evidence that the
decrease in sales may be driven by producers pulling products out of rural markets due to
the increased distribution costs to reach these areas.
While overall sales volume decreases, the second prediction of Proposition 2 – that market
share of multinationals will increase post-legislation – is met. Table 19 presents results on
the impact of price ceilings on firm market share. The first two columns present results for
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inhalants Injectables Liquids Solids
Price Ceiling 0.073 -0.067+ -0.005 -0.042∗∗
(0.117) (0.038) (0.051) (0.016)
Observations 39,725 351,489 592,361 2,202,645
Adj. R-squared 0.0213 0.00915 0.0196 0.0178
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions
shown here. Products from spillover groups are excluded from this
analysis. Drugs that are classified as an ”Other” category are ex-
cluded from this analysis.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 18: Effect of Treatment by Drug Category on Logged Sales Units
all products and clearly show that local firms lost significant market share, while multina-
tionals gained significant market share. The market share of exporter firms remained stable.
Columns 3 and 4 present the same results for acute products only, while columns 5 and
6 present these results for chronic products only. These show that multinational products
gain more in acute markets than in chronic markets. In the appendix, Table 39 shows that
these results hold when using a linear specification and Table 38 shows that these results
also hold when including spillover products. Thus it is clear that multinational products
gained significant market share post-legislation, particularly in acute markets, while local
products lost significant market-share.
5.3.3. Testing Proposition 3: Producer Exit
Proposition 3 indicates that producer exit is not necessarily more likely post-legislation
assuming that price ceilings are set sufficiently high; however, if exit does occur it is most
likely to be amongst low-priced local firms assuming marginal costs are sufficiently similar.
I test this proposition by examining likelihood of exit post-legislation for price-controlled
medications versus non-controlled medications.
Table 20 shows results on the likelihood of producer exit after implementation of price
ceilings. Columns (1) and (2) measure exit at the SKU level. These show that local firms
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Model: Fractional Probit Fractional Probit Fractional Probit
All Products Acute Products Chronic Products
Coef. APE Coef. APE Coef. APE
Market Share of:
Local -0.558*** -0.145*** -0.531*** -0.146*** -0.571*** -0.135***
(0.080) (0.026) (0.113) (0.023) (0.108) (0.034)
Exporter 0.090 0.033 0.045 0.017 0.130 0.047
(0.60) (0.027) (0.082) (0.028) (0.087) (0.036)
Multinational 0.299*** 0.075*** 0.367*** 0.091*** 0.213** 0.055**
(0.065) (0.020) (0.088) (0.022) (0.097) (0.024)
N 180,051 180,051 106,000 106,000 74,051 74,051
† APE standard errors are bootstrapped and all standard errors are robust. Spillover products are
excluded from this analysis.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 19: Change in Product Market Share by Firm Type - Excluding Spillover Products
are more likely to stop production of a given SKU after the legislation is enacted, however
there is no significant impact for exporter or multinational firms. Columns (3) and (4)
present the analysis at the company level – an important distinction as companies might
produce multiple SKUs for a given product – and tell a similar story. Even at a broader
firm level, local firms are more likely to exit a market post-legislation, however there is no
significant impact on firm exit for exporter or multinational firms. Columns (2) and (4)
show that market concentration does not have a significant impact on firms’ decisions to exit
after the legislation. Though local firms are of mixed reputation and quality, they produce
low-priced medicines that are important for consumer access – particularly for consumers
who are poor or live in rural areas (Dongre et al., 2010). The most price-sensitive consumers,
who depend on these low-cost products, are most likely to be negatively impacted by the
exit of local firms.
Table 41 in the Appendix presents these same results but this time include “spillover”
markets. Given the design of the legislation this distinction is quite important as companies
might be able to easily shift production from a drug formulation that has a price ceiling to
producing the same drug in a different dosage or formulation that is not controlled. For
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
SKU SKU Company Company
Exit Exit Exit Exit
Price Ceiling 0.162∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.095∗ 0.097+
(0.033) (0.039) (0.042) (0.055)
Chronic -0.079∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024)
Company Type
Exporter 0.049 0.048 -0.048 -0.058
(0.044) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
Multinational 0.166+ 0.166+ 0.116 0.106
(0.091) (0.091) (0.097) (0.098)
Market Concentration
Not Concentrated -0.041+ -0.077∗
(0.023) (0.033)
Highly Concentrated -0.011 0.050∗
(0.017) (0.025)
Price Ceiling × Chronic -0.032 -0.034 0.044 0.034
(0.038) (0.038) (0.049) (0.050)
Company Type
Price Ceiling × Exporter -0.103∗ -0.105∗ -0.127∗ -0.139∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.054) (0.056)
Price Ceiling × Multinational -0.184∗∗ -0.186∗∗ -0.148+ -0.162∗
(0.060) (0.062) (0.079) (0.078)
Market Concentration
Price Ceiling × Not Concentrated -0.031 0.028
(0.045) (0.066)
Price Ceiling × Highly Concentrated -0.007 0.032
(0.032) (0.054)
Constant 5.928∗∗∗ 5.499∗∗ -0.174 -0.206
(1.764) (1.781) (2.077) (2.098)
Observations 96,654 96,654 40,412 40,412
† Standard errors are clustered at the company level. Spillover products are excluded from
this analysis.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 20: Effect of Price Ceilings on SKU and Company Exit
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example, a firm might shift production of 250mg of amoxicillin, which is price-controlled,
to production of 125mg of amoxicillin, which is not. These results show that at the broader
product level, when including such spillover markets, that local firms do not see a significant
increase in exit post-legislation. This indicates that local firms are exiting only price-
controlled molecule formulations, but are continuing to produce non-controlled formulations
of the same molecule.
An interesting quirk of the Indian legislation is that, due to price ceilings being set based on
unweighted average market prices, certain classes of medications were more impacted than
others. For instance, in some markets the main producers might be the highest-priced, and
that market would see a large weighted average price decrease. On the converse, the top
seller in another market might be a relatively low-priced producer, and in this market the
average required price decrease might be near zero. This can have important implications for
producer exit, as the theoretical model in Chapter 4 predicts that restrictive price ceilings
increasingly dampen generic competition, and further induce exit of low-priced medications.
To test this prediction of the model, this analysis calculates the volume-weighted price
decrease that was directly imposed in each price-controlled market. It them subsegments
price controlled markets into quartiles based on the weighted markdown imposed on that
market, with non-price controlled drugs as a control group. Full results of this analysis are
shown in Table 21, and support the predictions of the theoretical model. This table again
shows that exit only increases amongst the control group of local firms. As predicted by the
theoretical model, exit was highest for markets that were most severely impacted by price
ceiling legislation. In fact, additional exit at the company-level was driven entirely by the
top quartile of most intensely impacted markets.
It is important to note that these results are all short-term and there may be increased exit
in the long-term. If companies are somewhat capacity constrained, then it may become
more profitable to exit markets with price ceilings as these companies make decisions to
renovate long term assets, such as production facilities, or as they are able to enter new
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
SKU SKU Company Company
Exit Exit Exit Exit
Price Ceiling Magnitude
High Impact 0.214∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.225∗∗ 0.223∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.085) (0.085)
Mid-High Impact 0.157∗ 0.158∗ 0.032 0.023
(0.062) (0.062) (0.097) (0.097)
Mid-Low Impact 0.147∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.008 0.009
(0.046) (0.046) (0.063) (0.063)
Low Impact 0.129∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.025 0.081
(0.047) (0.048) (0.063) (0.064)
Company Type
Exporter 0.049 0.048 -0.042 -0.053
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.048)
Multinational 0.161+ 0.160+ 0.131 0.121
(0.091) (0.091) (0.098) (0.100)
Market Concentration
Not Concentrated -0.044∗ -0.054+
(0.020) (0.029)
Highly Concentrated -0.012 0.067∗∗
(0.016) (0.023)
Price Ceiling Magnitude x Company Type
High Impact × Exporter -0.117 -0.114 -0.207+ -0.211+
(0.076) (0.076) (0.112) (0.112)
High Impact × Multinational -0.227+ -0.223+ -0.183 -0.189
(0.123) (0.123) (0.201) (0.200)
Mid-High Impact× Exporter -0.101 -0.102 -0.206 -0.205
(0.072) (0.072) (0.127) (0.127)
Mid-High Impact× Multinational -0.223+ -0.223+ -0.100 -0.097
(0.118) (0.117) (0.193) (0.194)
Mid-Low Impact × Exporter -0.075 -0.072 -0.062 -0.064
(0.057) (0.057) (0.085) (0.085)
Mid-Low Impact × Multinational -0.152+ -0.148+ -0.187 -0.189
(0.088) (0.088) (0.139) (0.140)
Low Impact × Exporter -0.122+ -0.128+ -0.200∗ -0.216∗
(0.065) (0.066) (0.098) (0.099)
Low Impact × Multinational -0.087 -0.093 -0.124 -0.141
(0.086) (0.086) (0.116) (0.115)
Constant 5.788∗∗ 5.473∗∗ -1.797 -1.694
(1.760) (1.772) (1.972) (1.988)
Observations 96,654 96,654 44,207 44,207
Table 21: Effect of Price Ceiling Magnitude on SKU and Company Exit
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generics markets as medications lose patent protection.
5.4. Conclusion
When market forces fail to drive down prices in an off-patent pharmaceutical market, coun-
tries have increasingly turned to regulating prices with direct price controls. There is limited
empirical evidence on the effects of such controls in LMICs where insurance coverage rates
are lower and generic competitors are not guaranteed to be bioequivalent to originator med-
ications. This study provides evidence of the impacts of market-based price ceilings on a
set of medicines in the Indian retail market. While price ceilings only have a direct effect on
high-priced competitors, both theoretical and empirical evidence from the Indian market
show that competitive effects may cause even the lowest priced competitors to lower prices.
This can have a positive impact, even for the poorest consumers, assuming this additional
pricing pressure does not cause low-priced competitors to exit the market.
Theory on vertically differentiated markets suggest that price ceilings should increase market
share of originator products. Empirically, this is the case in India, as multinationals increase
market share in price-controlled markets at the expense of small, local companies. However,
counter to theory, multinationals do not significantly increase sales and the total size of the
price-controlled markets shrink significantly as compared to the non-controlled markets.
Importantly, this decrease in market size spills over to closely related products, suggesting
a potentially wider-reaching negative impact of the legislation. While the legislation benefits
consumers through lower prices for medications, it also leads to a significant decrease in
sales, suggesting that the legislation is preventing trade that otherwise would have occurred.
This decrease in sales is likely most harmful for the rural poor as the supply chain costs to
reach these consumers are highest, and producers may no longer continue to contract with
the wholesalers who serve these populations.
India is unique in that it has a substantial market size and a large, local generics manu-
facturing industry able to meet most of the country’s demand for generic medicines. Not
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every country has these characteristics. Smaller countries, in particular, might not have a
large enough market size to encourage generic manufacturers to either produce locally or
import their medicines. While the unique aspects of India’s pharmaceutical market make it
hard to generalize findings from India to smaller markets, there are two important findings
from the Indian market that are more widely applicable. First is that a price ceiling may
be effective at reducing all pharmaceutical prices, however this additional pricing pressure
may cause low-priced products to exit the market. If a large portion of the market depends
on low-priced, locally-produced medications this can lead to a net-negative impact for the
most at-need consumers. Second, price ceiling legislation may lead to an increased market
share for multinational products at the expense of local manufacturers. This could have a
major impact on the local generics industry – while the price ceilings may be less binding
on local firms, they will face additional pricing pressure and potentially a loss of sales post-
legislation. This, in turn, can discourage a local generics industry, which may be critical to
ensuring access to medicines.
This study only covers the short-term effects of the price control legislation, but long-
term effects are potentially very different. Over time, firms must make choices to pay
for maintenance of long-term assets, and may not be willing to pay for the renovation
or restoration of these assets if future profits are not sufficiently high. This could cause
firms to either exit price controlled markets in the long-term, or to cut production or
quality. Potential long-term exit would be exacerbated by reduced incentives to enter price-
controlled markets. In India, to sell a product in a state’s retail pharmacy market, a firm
must pay a high marketing fee. Mohapatra and Chatterjee (2017) find these fees to be
highest for small, local firms and multinational firms. Thus, the pricing pressure placed on
small, local manufacturers in conjunction with high costs to market entry may effectively
push the cheapest products – which are also of the lowest average quality – out of price-
controlled markets.
Producer exit is a major concern of introducing price controls. Foreseeing this issue, In-
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dia mandated that companies notify and receive approval to withdraw a price controlled
product from the market, which may have hampered exit that would otherwise have oc-
curred amongst multinationals. While multinational companies may have pulled certain
SKUs from markets, they did not exit the Indian markets at any increased rate after the
price control legislation – at least in the short-term. However, the majority of the price
controls studied here were on generic products that are relatively inexpensive to produce.
In February of 2017, India expanded price controls to cardiac stents, mandating that man-
ufacturers and importers “maintain smooth production and supply of coronary stents of all
brands.” This resulted in two multinational suppliers – Abbott and Medtronic – requesting
to withdraw their products from the market, and at least one other multinational com-
pany threatening to follow suit. This case highlights the trade-offs between encouraging
the entry of innovative products to the Indian market and assuring affordable pricing for
consumers. Monitoring long-term impacts of the legislation on not only price-controlled
products but also on the launch decisions of multinational producers will provide valuable
empirical evidence on these trade-offs.
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CHAPTER 6 : Conclusion
Lack of access to essential medicines is a serious public health issue that disproportionately
affects those living in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) (Laing et al., 2003). Nearly
one-third of the worlds population lack access to essential medicine, with rates in low-
income countries as high as half the population (World Health Organization, 2004). Prices
can serve as one barrier to medicine access, particularly in markets with low insurance
coverage, as is common in LMICs. The high prices of on-patent medications in LMICs has
long been a contentious issue, but even the entry of generic medications has not necessarily
been sufficient to achieve affordable prices (Danzon et al., 2015). This is partially driven
by uncertain quality of generic products sold in LMIC markets, which leads to branded
generics markets. When generic products are viewed as being differentiated by brand, price
competition is dampened - potentially in economically significant ways. Indeed, the Indian
market shows wide price ranges for different generic brands of the same medication.
Pharmaceutical price controls are one tool LMIC governments and health departments may
use to constrain medicine prices with the goal of increasing affordability. A large body of
evidence from high-income countries (HICs) shows that no price control regime is perfect –
each comes with realized downsides. The dearth of evidence on the impacts of pharmaceu-
tical price regulation in LMICs is of concern, as these markets have economically important
differences that can lead to vastly different outcomes than in high-income countries. This
analysis, in fact, shows that the market differences between LMICs and HICs can lead to
significantly different outcomes, even for identical policies. While marginal costs for firms
may be relatively constant with volume in HICs, this is unlikely to be the case in LMICs
as supply chain costs to reach rural areas are particularly high due to sparsely populated
villages, lack of paved roads, and dearth of other necessary infrastructure. Economic theory,
presented in Chapter 4, shows that when marginal costs are constant, the market response
to price ceiling regulation is an increased supply. However, when marginal costs are increas-
ing in volume, market response to price ceiling regulation is ambiguous, with market-level
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supply potentially decreasing. Empirical evidence from India indeed shows that increasing
marginal costs are evident and economically important. In this setting, price ceiling leg-
islation led to market-level supply decreasing significantly, with firms most likely to pull
products from rural areas – a particularly dire impact, given that rural areas already suffer
from lack of access to medical care.
While the Indian setting is specific, it more generally provides a setting to study how
producers respond to price controls in branded generics markets. While India is unique in
its substantial market size and world-class generics manufacturing industry, a number of
findings from this setting may be more widely applicable. First is that price ceilings may
be effective at reducing all pharmaceutical prices, however the associated pricing pressure
may – somewhat counterintuitively – lead to low-priced products exiting the market. This
can lead to consumer welfare decreasing, despite the price decreases, if a large portion of
the population depends on these low-priced medications. Second is that, as low-priced
medications are often locally produced, price ceilings may be thought of as one way to
drive down pharmaceutical costs without hurting local business. However, price ceilings are
likely to lead to an increase in market share for multinational products at the expense of
local business - a potential downside to policy-makers. Third, is that there are potentially
large quality differences between different drug manufacturers. Evidence from India shows
that low-priced medicines are also of lower-quality on average. Thus the gain in market-
share amongst multinational firms, while certainly dampening generic competition, may
have health effects that overwhelm other welfare effects.
This dissertation provides new theoretical and empirical evidence on the impacts of price
control legislation in an LMIC. Nonetheless, it is only one study, examining only short-term
outcomes in one country. The welfare impacts of other implementations of pharmaceutical




A.1. Abbreviations Used in Dissertation
• CFA: Clearing and Forwarding Agent
• DPCO: Drug Price Control Order
• EMA: European Medicines Agency
• EPhMRA: European Pharmaceutical Market Research Association; an organization
which has created a standardized classification system for pharmaceutical products
used in this paper
• FDA: United States Food and Drugs Administration
• FDCA: Indian Food and Drug Control Administration
• HIC: High-income country
• HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; measure of market concentration
• LMIC: Low- and middle-income country
• MCC: Marginal cost of capital
• MEI: Marginal efficiency of investment
• MRP: Maximum retail price; price to consumer listed on medication box
• NLEM: (Indian) National List of Essential Medicines
• NPPA: National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority; regulatory body that sets phar-
maceutical price ceilings
• PCI: Per capita income
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• R&D: Research and development
• SKU: Stock keeping unit
• SRA: Stringent regulatory authority
• WHO: World Health Organization
• WHO GMP: World Health Organization Good Manufacturing Practice certified phar-
maceutical production plant
• WTO: World Trade Organization
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A.2. Drug Quality Appendix
Figure 8: Corruption Index by Indian State According to Charron (2010)
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Figure 9: Ease of Opening a Business by Indian State According to Make in India et al.
(2015)
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A.3. Empirical Analysis of the Impacts of Pharmaceutical Price Controls Appendix
Figure 10: Timeline of Drug Price Regulation in India Between 1955 to Present
In 1955, India established the Essential Commodities Act, which allowed regulators to control prices of
consumer products under Section 3. Under the Essential Commodities Act, drug prices have been controlled
using a series of Drugs Price Control Orders (“DPCOs”), beginning in 1970. Under a DPCO issued in
1995, India established the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (“NPPA”), an organization which
has limited ability to review and fix pharmaceutical prices (Narula, 2015). Under the most recent DPCO,
issued in 2013, the NPPA has authority to maintain and expand the National List of Essential Medicines
(“NLEM”), a list of medications based off the World Health Organization’s list of essential medicines, and
place drugs on this list under price controls (Narula, 2015).
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A.3.1. Robustness - Test of Proposition 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Price Chronic Company
Effect Ceiling Interaction Type
Interaction Interaction
Logged MRP
Price Ceiling -0.116∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling 0.002
(0.007)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.057∗∗∗
(0.007)
Company Type
Exporter × Price Ceiling 0.013+
(0.007)
Multinational × Price Ceiling -0.058∗∗∗
(0.013)
Observations 2,263,423 2,263,423 2,055,980 2,263,423
Adj. R-squared 0.124 0.124 0.128 0.125
Logged Retailer Markup
Price Ceiling -0.159∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling 0.004
(0.011)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.075∗∗∗
(0.010)
Company Type
Exporter × Price Ceiling 0.033∗∗
(0.011)
Multinational × Price Ceiling -0.087∗∗∗
(0.019)
Observations 2,106,410 2,106,410 2,050,499 2,106,410
Adj. R-squared 0.107 0.107 0.108 0.107
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here. Products
from spillover groups are excluded from this analysis, as are SKUs that exit the market
after May 2013 when the first wave of price ceilings went into place.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 22: Effect of Price Ceilings on MRP, Retailer Markup, and Sales Units Sold - Ex-
cluding SKUs that Exit the Market
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Price Chronic Company
Effect Ceiling Interaction Type
Interaction Interaction
Logged MRP
Price Ceiling -0.041∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling -0.009
(0.007)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.023∗∗∗
(0.007)
Company Type
Exporter × Price Ceiling 0.024∗∗
(0.009)
Multinational × Price Ceiling 0.013
(0.013)
Observations 1,523,005 1,523,005 1,501,119 1,523,005
Adj. R-squared 0.153 0.153 0.155 0.153
Logged Retailer Markup
Price Ceiling -0.054∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling -0.015
(0.010)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.032∗∗
(0.010)
Company Type
Exporter × Price Ceiling 0.026∗
(0.013)
Multinational × Price Ceiling 0.015
(0.018)
Observations 1,520,489 1,520,489 1,498,791 1,520,489
Adj. R-squared 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.123
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here. Products
from spillover groups and SKUs that had less than 1% market share for a given product
in the year before relevant price controls were enacted are excluded from this analysis.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 23: Effect of Price Ceilings on MRP, Retailer Markup, and Sales Units Sold – Products
with Greater than 1% Market Share
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(1) (2) (3)
Main Effect Price Ceiling Chronic
Interaction Interaction
Logged MRP
Price Ceiling -0.106∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling 0.004
(0.011)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.054∗∗∗
(0.011)
Observations 976,362 976,362 763,269
Adj. R-squared 0.127 0.127 0.139
Logged Retailer Markup
Price Ceiling -0.155∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.014) (0.011)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling -0.005
(0.018)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.060∗∗∗
(0.018)
Observations 822,374 822,374 760,741
Adj. R-squared 0.0800 0.0800 0.0820
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here.
Products from spillover groups are excluded from this analysis. Only products
manufactured by local producers, as defined in Section 5.2.1, are included.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 24: Effect of Treatment on Price - Local Products Only
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(1) (2) (3)
Main Effect Price Ceiling Chronic
Interaction Interaction
Logged MRP
Price Ceiling -0.103∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling 0.004
(0.009)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.059∗∗∗
(0.008)
Observations 1,433,045 1,433,045 1,420,752
Adj. R-squared 0.111 0.111 0.112
Logged Retailer Markup
Price Ceiling -0.133∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling 0.009
(0.013)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.073∗∗∗
(0.011)
Observations 1,429,898 1,429,898 1,417,700
Adj. R-squared 0.113 0.113 0.113
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here.
Products from spillover groups are excluded from this analysis. Only products
manufactured by exporting producers, as defined in Section 5.2.1, are included.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 25: Effect of Treatment on Price - Exporter Products
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(1) (2) (3)
Main Effect Price Ceiling Chronic
Interaction Interaction
Logged MRP
Price Ceiling -0.168∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling -0.078∗∗∗
(0.022)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.018
(0.022)
Observations 246,658 246,658 244,743
Adj. R-squared 0.108 0.109 0.110
Logged Retailer Markup
Price Ceiling -0.234∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.020)
Under Ceiling × Price Ceiling -0.130∗∗∗
(0.029)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.076∗
(0.030)
Observations 245,498 245,498 243,601
Adj. R-squared 0.0899 0.0908 0.0906
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here.
Products from spillover groups are excluded from this analysis. Only prod-
ucts manufactured by multinational producers, as defined in Section 5.2.1, are
included.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 26: Effect of Treatment on Price - Multinational Products Only
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A.3.2. Standardized Dosage Results
As a robustness test, this analysis considers markets for solid dosage formulations (e.g.
pills) which are generally dosed in milligrams (mgs), which allows for dosage standardiza-
tion across products. By standardizing sales to a common dosage, accounting for different
medication strengths and different pack sizes, this analysis can ensure that these product
differences are not driving results. In fact, the dosage-adjusted results are similar to the




Price Ceiling -0.045∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.065∗
(0.028)
Observations 1,427,872 1,403,946
Adj. R-squared 0.0172 0.0174
Local Products Only
Price Ceiling -0.073∗∗ -0.105∗∗
(0.028) (0.034)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.073
(0.051)
Observations 389,372 370,076
Adj. R-squared 0.0253 0.0260
Exporter Products Only
Price Ceiling -0.029 -0.040
(0.020) (0.027)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.026
(0.035)
Observations 906,436 902,461
Adj. R-squared 0.0139 0.0140
Multinational Products Only
Price Ceiling=1 -0.078 -0.201∗
(0.058) (0.080)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.258∗∗
(0.098)
Observations 132,064 131,409
Adj. R-squared 0.0291 0.0299
Table 27: Effect of Treatment on Dose-Adjusted Sales
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A.3.3. Spillover Group Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Main Effect Chronic Company Type
Interaction Interaction
Logged MRP
Price Ceiling -0.023∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.016∗∗∗
(0.002)
Company Type
Exporter × Price Ceiling 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002)
Multinational × Price Ceiling 0.006
(0.004)
Observations 2,481,755 2,405,516 2,481,755
Adj. R-squared 0.120 0.122 0.120
Logged Markup
Price Ceiling -0.029∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.021∗∗∗
(0.003)
Company Type
Exporter × Price Ceiling 0.014∗∗∗
(0.004)
Multinational × Price Ceiling 0.005
(0.006)
Observations 2,474,599 2,398,871 2,474,599
Adj. R-squared 0.101 0.102 0.101
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here.
Price-controlled products are excluded from this analysis.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001







Price Ceiling 0.042∗∗ 0.024
(0.015) (0.019)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.041
(0.029)
Observations 3,183,919 3,079,355
Adj. R-squared 0.0146 0.0146
Broad Product Market
Price Ceiling 0.001 -0.054∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.129∗∗∗
(0.013)
Observations 3,183,919 3,079,355
Adj. R-squared 0.0146 0.0151
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all
regressions shown here. Price-controlled products are
excluded from this analysis.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 29: Effect of Treatment on Logged Unit Sales of Spillover Products - Narrow and






Price Ceiling -0.026∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004)
Observations 837,539 775,508
Adj. R-squared 0.138 0.144
Exporter Firm
Price Ceiling -0.022∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
Observations 1,404,801 1,392,508
Adj. R-squared 0.118 0.118
Multinational Firm
Price Ceiling -0.030∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.014+
(0.008)
Observations 239,415 237,500
Adj. R-squared 0.113 0.115
Table 30: Effect of Treatment on Logged MRP on Spillover Products By Company Type -






Price Ceiling -0.032∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.027∗∗∗
(0.006)
Observations 834,523 772,890
Adj. R-squared 0.0815 0.0838
Exporter Firm
Price Ceiling -0.030∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004)
Observations 1,401,792 1,389,594
Adj. R-squared 0.115 0.115
Multinational Firm
Price Ceiling -0.026∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.030∗∗
(0.011)
Observations 238,284 236,387
Adj. R-squared 0.0930 0.0936
Table 31: Effect of Treatment on Logged Markup on Spillover Products By Company Type






Price Ceiling 0.031∗ -0.023
(0.014) (0.016)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.110∗∗∗
(0.021)
Observations 1,077,665 993,500
Adj. R-squared 0.0219 0.0225
Exporter Firm
Price Ceiling -0.010 -0.057∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.127∗∗∗
(0.016)
Observations 1,795,675 1,778,263
Adj. R-squared 0.0109 0.0114
Multinational Firm
Price Ceiling -0.110∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.039)
Chronic × Price Ceiling 0.182∗∗∗
(0.047)
Observations 310,579 307,592
Adj. R-squared 0.0231 0.0239
Table 32: Effect of Treatment on Logged Sales Units on Spillover Products By Company
Type - Broad Definition of Spillover
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Table 33: Effect of Price Ceilings Excluding Substitutable Price Controlled Medicines
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A.3.5. Additional Results from Analysis on Markup and Legislation Effects by Product Cat-
egory
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inhalants Injectables Liquids Solids
Price Ceiling -0.113 -0.098∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)
Observations 30,955 271,715 450,075 1,736,604
Adj. R-squared 0.152 0.0622 0.213 0.111
Table 34: Effect of Treatment by Drug Category on Logged MRP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inhalants Injectables Liquids Solids
Price Ceiling -0.107 -0.130∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.014) (0.015) (0.005)
Observations 30,948 270,819 448,945 1,731,440
Adj. R-squared 0.127 0.0837 0.118 0.100
Table 35: Effect of Treatment by Drug Category on Logged Retailer Markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Effect Local Firms Exporting Firms Multinat’l Firms
Bonus Sales 0.224∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.181∗
(0.022) (0.041) (0.028) (0.081)
Observations 2,094,259 718,541 1,173,700 202,018
Adj. R-squared 0.0163 0.0191 0.0134 0.0306
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here. Price-
controlled and spillover products are excluded from this analysis.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.3.6. Alternative Specifications of Market Share Analysis
Main Results Including Spillover Products
Model: Fractional Probit Fractional Probit Fractional Probit
All Products Acute Products Chronic Products
Coef. APE Coef. APE Coef. APE
Market Share of:
Local -0.529*** -0.138*** -0.535*** -0.147*** -0.498*** -0.118***
(0.067) (0.023) (0.094) (0.022) (0.095) (0.025)
Exporter 0.116* 0.043+ 0.119+ 0.045 0.098 0.036
(0.54) (0.024) (0.74) (0.031) (0.080) (0.034)
Multinational 0.256*** 0.064*** 0.283*** 0.070*** 0.218*** 0.056**
(0.061) (0.019) (0.082) (0.023) (0.092) (0.024)
N 181,305 181,305 106,829 106,829 74,404 74,404
Table 38: Change in Product Market Share by Firm Type - Including Spillover Groups
Linear Approximation with Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Local Firm Exporter Firm Multinational Firm
All Data
Price Ceiling -0.015∗∗∗ 0.002 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 180,051 180,051 180,051
Adj. R-squared 0.00140 0.000948 0.00706
Acute Products Only
Price Ceiling -0.013∗∗∗ -0.006 0.018∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 106,000 106,000 106,000
Adj. R-squared 0.00119 0.00148 0.00701
Chronic Products Only
Price Ceiling -0.017∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 73,979 73,979 73,979
Adj. R-squared 0.00172 0.000258 0.00702
Table 39: Effect of Legislation on Market Share by Firm Type
125
Two-Period Collapsed Difference-in-Difference
In the two-period model, I run two difference-in-difference estimations, separately comparing
products receiving price ceilings in 2013 and 2014 to products not receiving price ceilings.
In this analysis, I collapse data at the molecule (e.g. ibuprofen) level to two time periods:
pre-legislation (Jan 2010-August 2013 for the 2013 legislation and Jan 2010-June 2014
for the 2014 legislation) and post-legislation (September 2013-December 2015 for the 2013
legislation and July 2014-December 2015 for the 2014 legislation). Then, I run a traditional
difference-in-differences estimation using a fractional probit model with robust standard
errors, as in Equation A.1:
sit = γpostt + ηci + τpostt × ci + εit (A.1)




2013 Legislation 2013 Legislation 2014 Legislation
Chronic Only
Local Firm Market Share
Post x Price Ceiling -0.163 -0.291 -0.042
(0.253) (0.410) (0.644)
Post 0.072 0.060 0.067
(0.060) (0.097) (0.060)




Observations 5,520 2,199 5,069
Exporter Firm Market Share
Post x Price Ceiling 0.028 0.103 0.077
(0.153) (0.257) (0.331)
Post 0.005 0.006 -0.001
(0.049) (0.078) (0.049)




Observations 5,520 2,199 5,069
Multinational Firm Market Share
Post x Price Ceiling 0.104 0.039 -0.047
(0.179) (0.303) (0.366)
Post -0.100 -0.082 -0.082
(0.066) (0.104) (0.066)




Observations 5,520 2,199 5,069
Table 40: Effect of Legislation on Market Share
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A.3.7. Exit Including Spillover Drugs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SKU SKU Company Company
Exit Exit Exit Exit
Price Ceiling 0.162∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.015 0.002
(0.033) (0.039) (0.044) (0.059)
Chronic -0.079∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
Company Type
Exporter 0.049 0.048 -0.046 -0.057
(0.044) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
Multinational 0.166+ 0.166+ 0.133 0.122
(0.091) (0.091) (0.098) (0.099)
Market Concentration Not Concentrated -0.041+ -0.068∗
(0.023) (0.030)
Highly Concentrated -0.011 0.060∗
(0.017) (0.025)
Price Ceiling × Chronic -0.032 -0.034 0.070 0.062
(0.038) (0.038) (0.055) (0.055)
Company Type
Price Ceiling × Exporter -0.103∗ -0.105∗ -0.128∗ -0.135∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.055) (0.056)
Price Ceiling × Multinational -0.184∗∗ -0.186∗∗ -0.153+ -0.162+
(0.060) (0.062) (0.085) (0.084)
Market Concentration
Price Ceiling × Not Concentrated -0.031 0.072
(0.045) (0.070)
Price Ceiling × Highly Concentrated -0.007 0.038
(0.032) (0.056)
Observations 96,654 96,654 44,207 44,207
† Standard errors are clustered at the SKU level for all regressions shown here.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 41: Effect of Treatment on SKU and Company Exit
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